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Despite years of criticism from small business advocates,
the Securities and Exchange Commission has made little effort
to ameliorate the severe burdens on small companies seeking
to raise capital in compliance with the Securities Act of 1933
and SEC regulations. Substantial SEC attention has been given
in recent years to improving the capacity of large, publicly-
held companies to market securities, but smaller companies
have suffered from less-than-benign neglect. Responding to
this concern, the SEC recently adopted several proposals, and
has others pending, aimed at small business financing. These
proposals and adoptions, while modestly helpful, fall far short
of addressing the capital formation problems caused princi-
pally by SEC regulation and interpretations. In this article, the
authors examine the principal hurdles facing small businesses
seeking to raise capital under the securities laws, analyze the
background and potential bases for the current regulatory re-
gime, offer a critique based upon the twin goals of protecting
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investors and providing meaningful financing opportunities
for smaller businesses and set forth reform recommendations.
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INTRODUCTION: THE GULF BETWEEN SEC RHETORIC
AND ACTION
"Small businesses pump billions into the economy. They are, in
many ways, what makes America great. It's the SEC's job to see to it
that small business has better access to cheaper capital on the most
competitive terms possible, and we aim to do just that. We're on your
side - and we're proud to be your partners."
[SEC Chairman Christopher Cox's Opening Remarks to
the SEC Government-Business Forum on Small Business Capi-
tal Formation, Washington, D.C., September 29, 2006]
The track record of the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion ("SEC" or the "Commission") on small business capital
development has been decidedly at odds with Chairman Cox's
above-quoted remarks about the SEC's "partnership" with
small business advocates. The Small Business Forum, man-
dated by Congress as an annual SEC event,' has resulted in 25
years of repeated and strongly-worded recommendations from
small business advocates to lessen the SEC's regulatory bur-
1. An annual conference between the SEC and representatives of small
business interests is mandated by the Omnibus Small Business Capital For-
mation Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-477, § 80c-1, 94 Stat. 2292, 2293 (1980).
The Report from each conference, prepared by SEC staff, contains reform
recommendations proposed by conference participants. Reports from each
of the annual conferences can be accessed at http://www.sec.gov/info/
smallbnsiness/sbforumreps.htm.
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dens on raising capital. Yet, with rare exception, the SEC has
turned a deaf ear to the Forum's recommendations and con-
cerns. The SEC's participation in the Annual Forum is less a
"partnership" than a sad twist on the Caesarian boast, "we
came, we listened, we rejected." SEC initiatives in recent years
have focused principally on easing regulatory requirements for
registration of securities by publicly-traded companies. Pre-
cious little attention has been given to the more numerous
and difficult concerns faced by small companies seeking to
raise capital through exemption from registration. After years
of neglect, the SEC in August 2007 took its first significant
steps to demonstrate its commitment to supporting small busi-
ness capital formation by proposing several rule changes re-
garding limited offering exemptions. 2 Unfortunately, the pro-
posals, discussed below in Part II,3 offered modest reform at
best and failed to address the most significant regulatory barri-
ers to capital formation.
SEC Commissioners and staff are well aware of the sub-
stantial regulatory burdens imposed on small businesses and
the concerns emanating from such burdens. The 2005 Final
Report from the Small Business Forum stated that "the SEC
should issue a concept release on small business capital forma-
tion with a view to improving the utility of small business secur-
ities registration exemptions. . .. -"4 There was nothing novel
about this recommendation. The 1996 Report recommended
"a bottom up review of the Securities Act and the Securities
Exchange Act as they relate to the access of capital for small
businesses." 5 Recommendations for modification or elimina-
tion of technical exemption requirements are peppered
throughout the over two decades of Forum Reports. SEC staff
unquestionably hears similar concerns in securities law confer-
2. Revisions of Limited Offering Exemptions in Regulation D, Securities
Act Release No. 8,828, 2007 SEC LEXIS 1730 (Aug. 3, 2007). The comment
period ended October 9, 2007. Although the comment period ended Octo-
ber 9, 2007, as of February 2008 no further action had been taken. It is
unclear whether the proposals will be adopted substantially as proposed.
3. See infra text accompanying notes 85-97.
4. FINAL REPORT OF THE 24TH ANNUAL SEC GOVERNMENT-BusINESS Fo-
RUM ON SMALL BUSINESS CAPITAL FORMATION (2005), available at http://www.
sec.gov/info/smallbus/gbfor24.pdf.
5. FINAL REPORT OF THE 16TH ANNUAL SEC GOVERNMENT-BUSINESS Fo-
RUM ON SMALL BUSINESS CAPITAL FORMATION (1997), available at http://www.
sec.gov/info/smallbus/finrep 15.txt.
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Journal of Law and Business
[Vol. 4:1
HeinOnline  -- 4 N.Y.U. J. L. & Bus. 4 2007-2008
2007] SEC'S FAILURE TO ADDRESS SMALL BUSINESS CONCERNS 5
ences, discussions with small business representatives and
counsel, and through the SEC's Office of Small Business, cre-
ated within the Division of Corporate Finance for the purpose
of considering small business rulemaking initiatives.
The mystery is why the SEC has been so non-responsive to
the crescendo of small business concerns.6 This article will ex-
amine those concerns, SEC responses, policy considerations
relevant to the easing of exemption requirements, and reform
proposals that may enlarge the capital raising opportunities
for small businesses consistent with investor protection. In Part
I, we will discuss the impracticality of the registration process
for small businesses and briefly describe the principal
problems facing small businesses seeking to raise capital under
registration exemptions. Part II will examine the evolution of
legislative and regulatory registration exemptions. Part III will
critique the adequacy of such legislative and regulatory re-
sponses. Part IV will examine the SEC's reluctance to expand
exempt offering opportunities and offer some comparative ex-
amples from other developed economies. Part V will conclude
with reform proposals that we believe are consistent with the
investor protection policies underlying the Securities Act of
1933.
I.
PART I: MAKING IT TOUGH ON SMALL BUSINESS
The federal securities laws and their state counterparts7
can be reduced to two general requirements for issuers: (1)
6. It would not be fair to say that the Commission has not been mindful
of small business concerns. Recent amendments to regulations that allow
"free writing" prospectuses and create safe harbors for pre-registration com-
munications have included provisions for small, non-publicly held compa-
nies. The SEC has also extended the eligibility to use the Form S-3 registra-
tion statement, allowing for shelf registration of potential securities offer-
ings, to companies regardless of the size of their public float, although
limiting eligibility to issuers who have a class of securities registered on a
national securities exchange. Revisions to the Eligibility Requirements for
Primary securities Offerings on Forms S-3 and F-3, Securities Act Release No.
33-8878, 2007 WL4553468 (Dec. 27, 2007). However, none of the regulatory
adoptions have gone to the heart of the problem faced by small businesses in
raising capital under either the enormously costly registration process or
through technically difficult exemptions.
7. Congress chose not to preempt state securities laws when it adopted
the 1933 Securities Act. To the contrary, section 18 of the Act specifically
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register all offers and sales of your securities unless an exemp-
tion from registration is available, and (2) tell potential inves-
tors the complete truth about your business and the security
being offered. Unfortunately, these simple admonitions are
not easily translated into workable regulations. In reality, rais-
ing small amounts of capital is fraught with difficulty. The
irony is that, for both practical and legal reasons, it is easier for
a medium-sized company to raise $50 million than for a small
company to raise $500,000. While there are numerous exemp-
tions from registration theoretically available for a small offer-
ing of securities, the hurdles for compliance with registration
exemptions are legion.
Current securities regulation is having trouble coming to
grips with the transformations generated by the information
explosion over the past 25 years. Through the internet and
modern communications devices, an issuer can, in real time
and with no incremental cost, tell its story to literally millions
of potential investors. Those investors have access to nearly un-
limited information in selecting among potential investments.
The amount of available information, the speed with which it
is communicated and the globalization that brings interested
parties together continues to increase. Accelerating advances
in technology make the registration process set out in the 1933
Securities Act both quaint and obsolete. The laborious and
lengthy process of paper registration statements, physical
drafting sessions with dozens of participants and successive
nights at printing companies are largely gone. The SEC played
catch-up to the new world of communications with the Securi-
ties Offering Reform rules in 2005.8 However, the 2005 re-
forms dealt principally with communications prior to and dur-
ing registered offerings and, for the most part, benefited only
retained state jurisdiction over securities offerings. Section 18 was amended
in 1996 by the National Securities Markets Improvement Act (NSMIA), Pub.
L. No. 104-290, 110 Stat. 3416, 3417 (1996) by removing from state registra-
tion requirements the offering of "covered securities," a defined term that,
for purposes of smaller companies, principally relates to Rule 506 offerings.
The Commission is authorized to define a class of "qualified purchasers" for
whom state registration would also be preempted, but the Commission has
not acted to date to create this defined class. State law continues to be fully
applicable to "covered securities" offerings with regard to enforcement of
disclosure violations.
8. Securities Offering Reform, Securities Act Release No. 8,591, 2005
WL 1692642 (Aug. 3, 2005).
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large companies. For "well-known seasoned issuers," the fed-
eral securities registration process now conforms to the reali-
ties of modern commerce and communication, but there has
been little trickle-down effect for smaller companies.
Even more disappointing, the SEC has hardly addressed
the patchwork of exemptions from registration, much less up-
dated them to accommodate the changes in technology and
communications that led to the streamlined registered offer-
ing process for larger issuers. The prohibition on general solic-
itation, the archaic regulation of professional intermediaries
and the lack of uniform federal and state regulation together
conspire to emasculate the benefits of technological change.
Instead of harnessing the powerful forces of communications
and globalization, smaller issuers are forced to contend with
the legacy of disparate and paternalistic regulation.
A. The Impracticality of a Registered Offering
The twin imperatives for smaller businesses attempting to
grow are time and money. No matter how good the idea, how
promising the new product, or how valuable the process im-
provement, development funds are a constant necessity.
Driven by passion and hope, small businesses are incubators of
scientific and technological advance. The amount of money
needed to achieve new plateaus of success is often relatively
small but the margin for error is slim and the need for funds
immediate. The challenge is to obtain investment capital
quickly and efficiently. Pursuing the clear regulatory path - a
registered public securities offering - is not feasible for most
small companies. 9 The time, delay and expense of a registered
9. In December, 2007, the SEC eliminated Forms SB-1 and SB-2 applica-
ble to small business registrations. Smaller Reporting Company Regulatory
Relief and Simplification, Securities Act Release No. 33-8876, 2007 WL
4440393 (Dec. 19, 2007). All registration must now be accomplished on
Form S-i, the basic registration statement form. The so-called "scaled disclo-
sure requirements" previously set forth in the Forms SB and Regulation S-B
are now incorporated into revised Form S-1 requirements and Regulations S-
K and S-X, the basic disclosure and financial standards for registration state-
ments. Companies eligible for the scaled disclosures are those with less than
a $75 million public float or non-public companies with less than $50 million
annual revenues filing an initial registration statement (an increase over the
prior $25 million standards). The Commission's professed reason for elimi-
nation of the Forms SB was to avoid "the unwarranted negative perceptions
of the smaller reporting company disclosure scheme." Smaller Reporting
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securities offering are simply beyond the reach or practical
levels for small companies. Under ideal conditions, a regis-
tered offering may take up to six months or longer from the
time of initial preparation to the effective date. Following
weeks, if not months of preparation by company counsel, ac-
countants, and internal personnel of a draft registration state-
ment, the SEC staff comment process on the filed draft can
take several months and, during that period, market condi-
tions may change. This could result in a lower initial offering
price and fewer shares sold than anticipated. Costs and ex-
penses of lawyers, accountants, underwriters, and other profes-
sionals will generally total over 10% of the offering amount.
While a self-underwritten offering will cost less and, theoreti-
cally, can be completed in less time, results have not been posi-
tive for many non-underwritten offerings.Y°
While it is true that being publicly-held offers the pros-
pect of access to the world's capital markets, creates an equity
currency that can be used for growth by acquisition, and pro-
vides liquidity to investors, the hurdles to achieving public-
company status are legion. Moreover, for small, newer compa-
nies, there is no assurance that filing of a registration state-
ment will lead to a successful offering. There is no effective
way to test the market before filing a registration statement
due to the Commission's "gun jumping" rules." Moreover, re-
Company Regulatory Relief and Simplification, SEC Rel. No. 33-8819, 2007
WL 1975991 (July 5, 2007). Whether these changes, which are principally
ones of form rather than substance, will indeed improve the public percep-
tion of small company registrations is debatable. What is not debatable is
that the transformations do not alter the burdensome registration require-
ments. On the contrary, the Release actually increases those requirements by
requiring two years of audited balance sheets rather than one year as previ-
ously mandated.
10. William K. Sjostrom, Jr., Going Public Through An Internet Direct Public
Offering: A Sensible Alternative for Small Companies?, 53 FLA. L. R~v. 529, 593-94
(2001) (concluding that self-directed offerings using the internet are not
practical for most companies unless a company has a large affinity group,
such as particular customers, who will be attracted to the offering).
11. The Commission considers a company "in registration" from the
time it reached an understanding with an underwriter or a public offering is
otherwise contemplated through the entire period that dealers are required
to deliver copies of the prospectus to purchasers of the offered securities,
which is 90-days from commencement of the offering for first-time issuers.
Guidelines for Release of Information by Issuers Whose Securities are in Re-
gistration, Securities Act Release No. 5,180, 1971 WL 120474, at *1 (Aug. 20,
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Journal of Law and Business
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gardless of the outcome of the offering, the costs of the regis-
tration process are heavily front-loaded. Accounting fees, attor-
ney retainers, SEC filing fees, broker-dealer expenses, printing
and road show costs are all incurred and become payable prior
to the effective date of the registration statement.
Once public, the company is now subject to the periodic
reporting obligations of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
for at least the remainder of the first year.'2 The obligations
imposed on all public companies by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002 have led to substantially increased audit expense and fees
of attorneys and other advisors. The addition of dedicated
compliance personnel and the diversion of executive manage-
ment to non-operational imperatives such as compliance, in-
vestor relations and quarterly earnings reports introduce bur-
dens that never recede. These reporting and regulatory bur-
dens weigh extraordinarily heavily on public-traded small
businesses, prompting both administrative and legislative ef-
forts to modify such requirements for small business issuers.' 3
1971). During this entire time frame the company is not permitted to en-
gage in any activities that the Commission deems "is for the purpose of facili-
tating the sale of securities in a proposed offering." Id. The communication
limitations during the pre-filing period have been substantially lifted for
large, publicly held companies. Rule 163, 17 C.F.R. 230.163 (2007). For
small and first time issuers, the SEC created a safe harbor for communica-
tions more than 30 days prior to the initial filing of the registration state-
ment as long as such communications do not reference a securities offering
that will be the subject of the registration statement. Rule 163, 17 C.F.R.
230.163A (2007).
12. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78o(d) (1997).
13. On April 23, 2006, the SEC Advisory Committee on Smaller Public
Companies, in its final report to the Commission recommended that certain
smaller public companies be provided exemptive relief from the manage-
ment report requirement and from external auditor involvement in the Sec-
tion 404 process Linder certain conditions unless and until a framework for
assessing internal control over financial reporting is developed that recog-
nizes the characteristics and needs of these companies. FINAL REPORT OF THE
ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON SMALLER PUBLIC COMPANIES TO THE U.S. SECURITIES
AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION (April 23, 2006), available at http://www.sec.
gov/info/smallbus/acspc/acspc-finalreport.pdf. In April 2006, the U.S.
Government Accountability Office issued a report entitled UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, COMMITTEE ON SMALL BUSINESS AND
ENTREPRENEURSHIP, U.S. Senate, SARBANES-OXLEY ACT, CONSIDERATION OF
KEY PRINCIPLES NEEDED IN ADDRESSING IMPLEMENTATION FOR SMALLER PUBLIC
COMPANIES (April 2006). This report recommended that the Commission
consider whether the currently available guidance, particularly the guidance
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Journal of Law and Business
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The combined effect of the costs imposed by the registration
process and the post-registration reporting system is generally
more than sufficient to convince small businesses that financ-
ing through a registered public offering is a most undesirable
course. For most small businesses, the decision whether to "go
public" is, realistically, more theoretical than anything else. As
a practical matter, at least for early stage financings and when
$20 million or less of capital is needed, the question is how to
qualify for an exemption from registration.
B. The Challenge of Meeting Registration Exemption Conditions
Management of small businesses requiring substantial
capital inputs do not want to sell more control of the business
than necessary and therefore do not wish to raise money
before the amounts needed are known and the funds can be
put to good use. For most businesses, the precise timing and
financial requirements are unknown at the outset and remain
sporadic throughout development stages. While management
cannot predict exactly when and for what specific purpose ad-
ditional funding will be needed, it is likely that the need for
each new tranche will arise quickly. After seeking the advice of
securities counsel, management's hopes for relatively easy and
quick access to financing methodologies are quickly deflated
by warnings regarding integration of offerings, purchaser and
offeree qualifications, prohibitions against advertising and so-
licitation, numerical limits on purchasers, and state "blue sky"
on management's assessment, is sufficient or whether additional action is
needed to help companies comply with the internal control over financial
reporting requirements. On December 15, 2006, the SEC extended the com-
pliance dates for non-accelerated filers to provide management's report on
internal control over financial reporting until its annual report for its first
fiscal year ending on or after December 15, 2007. Internal Control Over
Financial Reporting in Exchange Act Periodic Reports of Non-Accelerated
Filers and Newly Public Companies, Securities Act Release No. 8,760, Ex-
change Act Release No. 54,942, 71 Fed. Reg. 76,580, 2006 SEC LEXIS 2922
(Dec. 15, 2006). Under the extension, a non-accelerated filer must begin to
provide the auditor attestation report in the annual report it files for its first
fiscal year ending on or after December 15, 2008. In February, 2008, the SEC
announced that it planned to further extend the compliance date to Decem-
ber 15, 2009, giving time to the Commission to undertake a cost-benefit anal-
ysis of the auditor attestation requirement under Section 404(b) as it applies
to smaller companies. SEC to Study Costs, Benefits, Of s. 404(b) Requirements for
Small Issuers, 40 Sec. Reg. L. Rep. (BNA) 168 (Feb. 5, 2008).
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laws. Dismay turns to dejection when given an estimate of the
legal, accounting and other costs to be incurred to avoid the
regulatory pitfalls. In short, management of smaller businesses
are faced with sometimes insurmountable obstacles in raising
money in full compliance with the securities laws. We will ex-
plore in greater detail the problematic aspects of the current
exemption scheme in Part III. Preliminarily we note the fol-
lowing regulatory hurdles:
(a) The ability to market the offered securities is severely limited.
The SEC's ban on general advertising and general solicitation
in private offerings under Section 4(2) of the 1933 Securities
Act, and in Rules 504, 505, and 506 under Regulation D, 14 not
only eliminates the potential of the internet to attract inves-
tors, the ban constricts the issuer to a narrow band of potential
investors with whom the issuer or its agents have a preexisting
relationship.
The marketing limitations may be ameliorated if smaller
companies are able to employ the services of broker-dealers.' 5
However, because small transactions are less lucrative than
large ones, they are of less interest to broker-dealers. Compa-
nies cannot usually rely on investment firms for assistance in
their smaller offerings. The work to prepare a private place-
ment memorandum and the legal costs involved are often sub-
stantial due to the lack of sophistication and informal internal
reporting systems of smaller issuers. For these reasons, the risk
of assisting a small transaction is simply not worth it for the
broker. This situation underscores the need to develop regis-
tration exemptions that provide practical benefits to issuers by
unshackling them from the limitations of the current rules,
14. See infra text accompanying notes 99-121, for discussion of the gen-
eral solicitation and general advertising prohibitions. Those prohibitions are
avoided if the issuer elects to use the intrastate offering exemption, but this
exemption has substantial in-state "doing business" requirements and cre-
ates enormous risks of violation from even a single inadvertent out-of-state
offer. Regulation A has no similar qualifications, but it is a modified form of
registration that entails many of the time and cost factors associated with
registration statements.
15. The prohibition against general solicitation does not apply to broker-
dealers who solicit existing customers from a pre-determined, screened list
of potential investors. See, e.g., Arthur M. Borden, Esq., SEC No-Action Let-
ter, 1978 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 2001 (Oct. 6, 1978).
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particularly the prohibition on solicitation of potential inves-
tors.
(b) The limitation on the number of non-accredited investors may
severely limit initial financing of a small business. Rules 505 and
506 limit the number of non-accredited investors under those
exemptions to 35 persons. 16 The numerical limitation is partic-
ularly hard on smaller companies because of the concurrent
prohibition against general advertising and general solicita-
tion. As a result, the founder of a new business is limited to an
investor pool of people with whom there is a pre-existing rela-
tionship. It is unlikely that very many of these individuals will
be "accredited investors" under Regulation D. Companies are
likely to need to rely on a large number of small investors to
meet their financial goals, yet that cannot be done under the
numerical limits of these rules.
(c) The failure to properly qualify investors and potential inves-
tors could invalidate an exemption from registration. The private
offering exemptions, Section 4(2) and Rule 506, impose "so-
phistication" and "experience" eligibility standards that sub-
stantially limit a small company's pool of potential investors. 17
Rule 506 modifies this requirement by allowing "accredited in-
vestors" to be purchasers without regard to their background
or knowledge and permitting non-accredited investors who
lack "knowledge and experience in financial and business mat-
ters" to use purchaser representatives as their agents.' 8 How-
ever, these modifications, when coupled with the prohibition
against general solicitation and numerical limitations, provide
16. "Limitation on Number of Purchasers: There are no more than or
the issuer reasonably believes that there are no more than 35 purchasers of
securities from the issuer in any offering under this Rule 505." 17 C.F.R.
§ 230.505(b) (ii) (2007).
"Limitation on Number of Purchasers: There are no more than or the issuer
reasonably believes that there are no more than 35 purchasers of securities
from the issuer in any offering under this Rule 506." 17 C.F.R.
§ 230.506(b) (2) (i) (2007).
Persons who qualify as "accredited investors" pursuant to Rule 501 (a) are
excluded from the number of purchasers. 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(e) (2007).
17. See infra notes 40-60 and accompanying text (discussing the private
offering exemption).
18. 17 C.F.R. § 230.506(b)(2)(ii) (2007). See infra text accompanying
notes 59-60.
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little comfort to companies that need to market their securities
beyond a narrow pool of potential investors.
(d) The lack of federal/state coordination magnifies the difficul-
ties of raising capital. Even when the issuer is able to qualify for
exemption from the 1933 Securities Act, there is no guarantee,
other than Rule 506, that the offering will be exempt from
state securities regulation. The lack of coordination explains
in large part why, for example, Regulation A, a conditional
small issues exemption for offerings of up to $5 million, is sel-
dom utilized. State law often adds a layer of cost and delay that
impedes the capital-raising process. The need to review state
law adds uncertainty and expense to a small private offering,
and where there are only a few known prospective purchasers
in a particular state, the time and costs of investigation and
state qualification may not be worth the effort.
(e) Separate financings may be integrated into a single offering
and, as a result, an exemption from registration may be lost. Under
the SEC's integration doctrine, 19 apparently distinct, separate
offerings of securities to raise needed working capital could be
deemed to be part of a single, unified, "integrated" offering,
thereby jeopardizing the validity of each of the separate, other-
wise exempt offerings. With a small, growing business that
needs financing on an ongoing basis, the possibility that two or
more offerings will be integrated is real. The SEC's adoption
of safe harbors for offerings that are made more than six
months apart may not provide sufficient cushion to accommo-
date pressing capital requirements. 20 The August 2007 SEC
Release included a proposal to reduce the six month safe har-
bor in Regulation D to 90 days. The reduced time frame is a
step in the right direction but does not adequately address in-
tegration concerns in light of the financing requirements of
smaller companies.2 1
19. The integration doctrine is discussed in text accompanying notes
137-146, infra.
20. The six-month safe harbors have been adopted for Rule 147, 17
C.F.R. § 230.147(b) (2) (2007), Regulations A, 17 C.F.R. § 230.251 (c) (2) (v)
(2007), and D, 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(a) (2007). There is no safe harbor for
offerings under section 4(2), 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2) (2000), or 3(a)(11), 15
U.S.C. § 77c(a) (11) (2000).
21. For a discussion of integration and the SEC proposal, see infra text
accompanying note 94.
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(/) Resales by purchasers can destroy a registration exemption.
Despite the issuer's best efforts, an investor's resale of a secur-
ity purchased in an exempt offering can destroy the exemp-
tion relied upon by the issuer to avoid registration. 22 Although
the issuer can extract strict representations from its purchasers
regarding their lack of intent to transfer the security and may
take other measures to avoid resales, the issuer cannot always
prevent or even know about a transfer which could invalidate
its registration exemption.
(g) Good faith compliance may not avoid violation. Exemption
requirements are technical and strict. Failure to comply with
each specified condition is likely to result in loss of the exemp-
tion. Although some exemptions contain nominal "substantial
compliance" provisions, these are of little value in most in-
stances. For example, while Rule 508 provides that insignifi-
cant deviations from a requirement of Regulation D do not
disqualify the exemption, the key exemption conditions of
Regulation D are expressly excluded from the term "insignifi-
cant deviations." 23 Therefore, the prohibition on the use of
general solicitation, the limitation on the number of purchas-
ers, and the limitation on offering amounts all must be strictly
observed and any transgression, however minor or unin-
tended, would not be deemed "insignificant." Erroneous ad-
vice from counsel that an exemption exists or that a particular
condition has been satisfied is also not a defense to a claim of
violation, no matter how reasonable the issuer's reliance on
counsel.
The litany of obstacles imposed by exemption conditions
does not fully describe their cumulative, negative impact on
small companies that have no feasible alternative to raise capi-
22. All federal exemptions except offerings under Regulation A,
§§ 230.251-63, and to some extent Rule 504, 17 C.F.R. § 230.504 (2007),
have resale limitations that affect the validity of an issuer's exemption if pur-
chasers resell their securities within too short a time frame or to someone
who would not be an eligible purchaser in the initial offering. Resales that
violate such limitations can result in the issuer's loss of its exemption despite
the fact that the issuer had complied with all of the exemption's require-
ments. See infra text accompanying notes 152-165.
23. 17 C.F.R. § 230.508(a) (2) (2007). Rule 508 was added to Regulation
D several years after the Regulation's adoption in response to concerns from
attorneys that minor or inadvertent deviations from the Regulation's strict
requirements could void an otherwise valid exemption.
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Journal of Law and Business
[Vol. 4:1
HeinOnline  -- 4 N.Y.U. J. L. & Bus. 14 2007-2008
2007] SEC'S FAILURE TO ADDRESS SMALL BUSINESS CONCERNS 15
tal other than through an exempt process. The federal exemp-
tions from registration have grown, been modified, inter-
preted and re-interpreted since the adoption of the 1933 Se-
curities Act. The result is an impenetrable screen of technical,
sometimes inconsistent, and often ambiguous patchwork of
regulations that inhibit the flow of capital to developing busi-
nesses. In Part II, we will examine the historical development
of registration exemptions leading to today's somewhat un-
happy conglomeration.
II.
PART II: THE EVOLUTION OF REGISTRATION EXEMPTIONS
The statutory and administrative provisions that regulate
(or, to be more accurate, that inhibit) capital formation by
small companies reflect an evolving process dating from the
adoption of the 1933 Securities Act. If we limited our examina-
tion only to the current set of rules and regulations, one would
be justified in asking how we ended up with such unusual and
internally inconsistent provisions. To understand where we are
today, we need to start at the beginning.
A. In the Beginning: The 1933 Securities Act
The 1933 Securities Act, among the first pieces of New
Deal legislation, was President Roosevelt's and Congress' re-
sponse to the stock market debacle of 1929 and ensuing years.
Congressional hearings revealed massive instances of fraud
and insider abuse that were significant factors causing one-half
of the $50 billion of securities sold to the public post World
War I to become worthless. 24 The hearings also evidenced the
inability of state securities laws to regulate effectively the inter-
state sale of securities. 25 State agencies had inadequate re-
sources to regulate effectively interstate transactions. A 1933
Department of Commerce report noted that "the most effec-
tive and widely used method of evading the provisions of State
24. H.R. REP. No. 73-85, pt. 2, at 2 (1933).
25. State securities laws, known colloquially as "blue sky laws," had been
in existence since 1911, when Kansas became the first state to adopt a securi-
ties law with provisions regarding registration, licensing of sales personnel,
and anti-fraud provisions. 1911 Kan. Sess. Laws 210. Within the next decade
nearly every state adopted similar provisions.
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blue sky laws consists in operating across State lines." 26 The
result of the Congressional hearings was a federal registration
scheme, specific disclosure requirements, and a broad menu
of administrative, civil, and criminal sanctions, all adminis-
tered by a single central agency. The Federal Trade Commis-
sion was the initial administering agency, until adoption of the
1934 Exchange Act and establishment thereunder of the SEC.
Section 5, the heart of the 1933 Securities Act, mandates
the registration of all offers to sell securities through the use of
an instrumentality of interstate commerce. 27 The registration
process adopted was similar to that in existence at the state
level, involving a disclosure document reviewed by an adminis-
trative agency prior to any sales transactions. 28 The disclosure
document's content and form was not left to issuer's choice.
Schedule A to the 1933 Act sets forth a precise list of 32 items
to be disclosed, subject to augmentation by the Commission
"for the protection of investors." 29 Recognizing that registra-
tion is a time-consuming, cumbersome process, Congress pro-
vided two specific registration exemptions, the intrastate ex-
emption in Section 3 (a) (11) and the private offering exemp-
tion in Section 4(2). These were not intended to be the sole
registration exemptions. Significantly, Section 3(b) of the
1933 Act authorizes the Commission to adopt additional ex-
emptions where registration "is not necessary in the public in-
terest and for the protection of investors."30
26. A Study of the Economic and Legal Aspects of the proposed Federal
Securities Act: Hearing on H.R. Rep. No. 4314 Before the H. Comm. on
Interstate & Foreign Commerce, 73rd Cong. 87, 100 (1933).
27. Securities Act of 1933 § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 77e(c) (2000).
28. A principal difference between the federal and state registration
schemes is the lack of merit review standards at the federal level. Disclosure
alone is the requirement, and the SEC has no authority, unlike many state
agencies, to preclude or impose conditions on an offering that is regarded
by the Commission as economically unsound. Assuming full disclosure of all
risks and uncertainties attendant to an offering, federal policy places the
onus on the potential investor to determine the merits. See, e.g., THOMAS LEE
HAZEN, THE LAw OF SECURITIES REGULATION at 130 (5th ed. 2005) ("The SEC
does not review the merits of the registration statement and the offering.
Rather, in reviewing the 1933 Act registration statements... the focus is on
the adequacy and clarity of the disclosure.").
29. Securities Act of 1933 § 10(c), 15 U.S.C. § 77j(c) (2000).
30. Securities Act of 1933 § 3(b), 15 U.S.C. 77c(b) (2000).
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1. The Intrastate Exemption: Section 3(a)(11) and Rule 147
The statutory intrastate exemption applies to:
- any security
- which is part of an issue
- offered and sold only to residents within a single state or
territory
- by an issuer resident and doing business within such
state or territory.31
The exemption is not based on any constitutional distinc-
tion between intrastate and interstate commerce. 32 The ex-
emption was premised on the belief that state securities regu-
lators could effectively administer offerings that were limited
to that state's geographic area, thus obviating the need for
concurrent federal registration. The SEC noted in 1974 that
the policy behind the intrastate exemption is that investors are
"protected both by their proximity to the issuer and by state
regulation. ' 33 As with all exemptions, federal anti-fraud provi-
sions continue to apply.34
31. "Any security which is part of an issue offered and sold only to per-
sons resident within a single State or Territory, where the issuer of such se-
curity is a person resident and doing business within or, if a corporation,
incorporated by and doing business within, such State or Territory." Securi-
ties Act of 1933 § 3(a)(11), 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(11) (2000). The exemption
was originally set forth in section 5(c) of the Securities Act of 1933, Pub. L.
No. 22, 48 Stat. 74 (1933). The Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No.
290, 48 Stat. 881 (1934), transferred the provision to Section 3(a) (11) of the
Securities Act of 1933.
32. The mandate to register offers and sales of securities is conditioned,
inter alia, on the use of an instrumentality of interstate commerce. Securities
Act of 1933 § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 77e (2000). Such instrumentalities include the
use of the mails, check clearinghouses, telephone, internet, and transporta-
tion facilities. If any such instrumentalities are used, registration is required,
unless an exemption can be utilized, even if the offers and sales are wholly
within a single state.
33. General Rules and Regulations, Securities Act of 1933, Exchange Act
Release No. 5,450, 39 Fed. Reg. 2353 (Jan 21, 1974).
34. "The exemptions provided in section 3 shall not apply to the provi-
sions of this section." Securities Act of 1933 § 17(c), 15 U.S.C. § 77q(c)
(2000). Reference in section 17 is only to section 77c because section 77c
purports to exclude, except as otherwise provided, the listed types of securi-
ties from all provisions of the Act, whereas the section 4 exemptions are
transactional only and not otherwise exempt from any other 1933 Act provi-
sions. 15 U.S.C. § 77d (2000).
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The statutory intrastate exemption is replete with ambigu-
ous references, including "part of an issue," "residents," and
"doing business." Given these ambiguities, the exemption's pa-
rameters have been developed principally through SEC inter-
pretive releases, no-action letters, and judicial interpretations.
A 1961 SEC Release attempted to outline objective criteria for
the "part of an issue" concept, which essentially deals with
whether two or more seemingly disparate offerings should be
integrated as one offering,3 5 and SEC no-action letters and ju-
dicial decisions have sought to clarify the "doing business" re-
quirement by mandating that a significant amount of the is-
suer's assets, revenues, and proceeds from the offering be uti-
lized within the issuer's own state. 36 Despite years of
interpretive and judicial guidelines, substantial uncertainty re-
mained (and still does) as to the exemption's outer bounda-
ries. The SEC reacted to these uncertainties in 1974 by creat-
ing Rule 147, setting forth a precise set of objective standards
for an intrastate exemption. Rule 147 addresses the "part of an
issue" concept by creating six-month integration safe harbors
and the "doing business" issue by creating a series of 80% tests
for revenues, assets, and use of proceeds. The Rule contains
specific residency definitions for various types of issuers and
investors and provides for a 9-month period during which out-
of-state resales are prohibited. The Rule is not a substitute for,
nor a Commission interpretation of, Section 3(a) (11). Rule
147 is an independent intrastate offering exemption issued
under the SEC's Section 19 rule-making authority.37 An issuer
thus has two potential intrastate exemptions and can seek re-
lief under one or both. Failure to achieve the technical re-
quirements of Rule 147 does not preclude the issuer from ar-
35. See Exemption for Local Offerings from Registration, Securities Act
of 1933, Exchange Act Release No. 4,434, 1961 WL 61651, at *1 (Dec. 6,
1961). The integration doctrine is discussed in accompanying text at notes
128-137, infra.
36. See American Ind. Delivery, SEC No-Action Letter, 1973 WL 10394, at
1-2 (Jan. 8, 1973) (no-action letter under Section 3(a) (11) refused where
issuer intended to use 25% of the proceeds for out-of-state business expan-
sion); see also SEC v. McDonald Inv. Co., 343 F. Supp. 343, 344-46 (D. Minn.
1972) (income producing activities cannot be out of state unless generated
by in-state activities).
37. Securities Act of 1933 § 19(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77s(a) (2000) ("The Com-
mission shall have authority ... to make . . .such rules and regulations as
may be necessary to carry out the provisions of this subchapter ....").
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guing that the more ambiguous standards of Section 3(a)(11)
have been satisfied."8 Although Rule 147 and administrative
guidelines have added clarity, substantial compliance difficul-
ties remain and both the statutory and regulatory intrastate ex-
emptions suffer from a lack of utility.39
2. The Private Offering Exemption: Section 4(2) and Rule 506
The nine words that comprise the statutory private offer-
ing exemption are a monument to brevity and ambiguity. The
Section 4(2) exemption reads: "transactions by an issuer not
involving any public offering. '4 0
The scant legislative history refers only to transactions
"where there is no practical need for [the bill's] application or
where the public benefits are too remote."'4' Congressional re-
ports indicate that the exemption was intended for small, non-
underwritten offerings. As adopted in 1933, the provision
read: "transactions by an issuer not with or through an under-
writer and not involving any public offering."
38. Thus, for example, if the issuer fails to meet one of the 80% tests set
out in Rule 147 with respect to the doing business requirement, issuer may
nevertheless claim that it has met the more ambiguous "doing business" stat-
utory standard, however that may be interpreted by the courts.
39. Numerous problems undercut the utility of the intrastate exemption.
Rule 147, like Section 3(a)(11), continues the prohibition against offers or
sales to out-of-state residents without regard to the inadvertence, mistake, or
good faith of issuer. A single offer to a non-resident constitutes a violation
for which there is no defense. Moreover, given the SEC's broad definition of
"offer," materials or statements might be given or made to non-residents that
constitute an "offer" and ipso facto void any exemption. Nor is there any "no
harm no foul" concept in which an offer to, but not a purchase by, a non-
resident is not a violation. The exemptions incorporate the integration doc-
trine, which is very problematic for small companies. The 80% tests of Rule
147 are strict, the percentage appears unreasonably high in light of today's
global economy, and judicial construction of the "doing business" require-
ment remains both ambiguous and difficult. In addition, the exemptions
regard out-of-state resales as violations by the issuer regardless of measures
taken by the issuer to safeguard against such resales.
40. Securities Act of 1933 § 4(2), 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2) (2000). This provi-
sion was initially the second clause of§ 4(1) of the 1933 Securities Act. It was
renumbered as § 4(2) in 1964, Act of Aug. 20, 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-467, 78
Stat. 580 (1964). The introductory portion of Section 4 states: "The provi-
sions of Section 5 shall not apply to -. "
41. H.R. REP. No. 73-85, at 5, 7, 15-16.
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The words "not with or through an underwriter" were de-
leted in the 1934 Exchange Act,42 a change regarded as not
being substantive and simply the elimination of superfluous
language.43 The ambiguity of the statutory language has re-
sulted in a plethora of administrative and judicial efforts to
clarify its meaning. Early SEC guidance was very much based
on numerical limits, both as to the number of offerees, num-
ber of units offered, and total amount being raised. 44 A Com-
mission member stated in 1957 that: "[A] s a rule of thumb, the
Commission has considered that an offering made to not
more than 25 or 30 persons, who take the securities for invest-
ment and not for distribution, is generally a private transaction
not requiring registration."45
The relative simplicity of the private offering exemption
was shattered by the Supreme Court in 195346 in ways that are
perplexing and problematic. Ralston Purina involved an annual
company program offering small quantities of stock to so-
called "key employees." The SEC challenged the validity of the
offers on grounds that there was no registration exemption
available, in particular that the number of offerees and their
relative lack of knowledge about the company were incompati-
ble with the policy of the private offering exemption. 47 The
SEC's argument was rejected by both the District Court and
the Court of Appeals, both of which pointed out the relation-
ship between the employer and the offerees, the lack of any
formal solicitation, the limited number of shares distributed,
42. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, sec. 203(a), § 4(1), 48 Stat.
906 (1934).
43. H.R. REP. No. 73-1838, at 41 (1934).
44. Letter of General Counsel discussing the factors to be considered in
determining the availability of the exemption from registration provided by
the second clause of Section 4(1), Securities Act Release No. 285, 1935 WL
27785, at *1-2 (Feb. 24, 1935). The generally accepted doctrine up until the
1950s was that the private offering exemption allowed offers up to 25 per-
sons without any other limitation. Beyond that number, one would need to
look at the relationship among the parties, the number of units offered, and
the manner of offering.
45. Andrew Downey Orrick, Some Observations on the Administration of
the Securities Laws, 42 MINN. L. REv. 25, 33 (1957).
46. See SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 127 (1953).
47. In 1949 there had been 414 purchasers, in 1950 there were 411 pur-
chasers, and in 1951 there were 165 before the program was halted. Purchas-
ers lived in over 50 states and held jobs such as bakeshop foreman, produc-
tion trainee, clerical assistant, and veterinarian.
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and the investment intent of the purchasers. 48 The Supreme
Court could have accepted the lower courts' reasoning, thus
confirming the basic numerical aspect of the private offering
exemption or, if the Court wanted to reverse, it could have
done so solely on the basis of the large number of offerees and
purchasers in the program. The number of offerees and pur-
chasers had in fact been the principal basis for the SEC's argu-
ment.49 Instead, the Court chose to turn the Section 4(2) ex-
emption from a relatively simple, numerically-oriented exemp-
tion into an exemption based on concepts of access to
information, disclosure, and the elusive quality of being able
to "fend for oneself."50
The Ralston Purina decision spawned a cottage industry of
SEC releases and judicial decisions attempting to clarify the
Supreme Court's doctrinal guidelines, in particular who is an
eligible offeree and purchaser, who is entitled to disclosure,
how disclosure should be made, and the manner of offering.5 1
Courts had to give substance to Ralston Purina's elusive con-
cept of being able to "fend for oneself," a concept that eventu-
ally settled into notions of "sophistication." However, although
"sophistication" became a widely accepted element of the pri-
48. See SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 200 F. 2d 85, 93 (6th Cir. 1952) (".....
we do not think that the intra-organizational offerings of stock by the Com-
pany, unaccompanied by any solicitation, which have resulted in a limited
distribution of stock, for investment purposes, to a select group ... will frus-
trate or impair the purposes of the Act.").
49. Tom A. Alberg & Martin E. Lybecker, New SEC Rules 146 and 147: The
Nonpublic and Intrastate Offering Exemptions from Registration for the Sale of Securi-
ties, 74 COLUM. L. REv. 622, 625 (1974) (A... rather than determine the case
upon application of a numbers test, as was urged by the Commission ....).
Mr. Lybecker was a member of the SEC staff.
50. "The design of the statute is to protect investors by promoting full
disclosure of information thought necessary to informed investment deci-
sions. The natural way to interpret the private offering exemption is in light
of the statutory purpose. Since exempt transactions are those as to which
'there is no practical need for... [the bill's] application,' the applicability of
[Section 4(2)] should turn on whether the particular class of persons af-
fected need the protection of the Act. An offering to those who are shown to be
able to fend for themselves is a transaction 'not involving any public offering."' 346
U.S. 119, 124-25 (1953) (emphasis not in original).
51. Non-Public Offering Exemption, Securities Act Release No. 4,552,
Fed. Sec. L Rep. (CCH) 2770, at 2915 (Nov. 6, 1962) ("... an increasing
tendency to rely upon the exemption for offerings of speculative issues to
unrelated and uninformed persons prompts this statement to point out the
limitations on the availability.").
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vate offering exemption, there was (nor still is) no uniformity
as to its meaning. At least one Circuit has denied that a poten-
tial investor must satisfy a sophistication standard,52 and appli-
cation of this principle in the statutory exemption remains
very unclear. 53 The maelstrom of interpretive positions placed
the viability of the private offering exemption in considerable
doubt. A 1975 Position Paper by a committee of the American
Bar Association stated that 'judicial precedents have not been
particularly helpful.... The courts... have used extremely
broad dicta which, if taken literally, would leave little viability
in the exemption under the statute. ' 54 Even the Chairman of
the SEC referred to the array of legislative, administrative, and
judicial authorities as "[a] kind of mishmash." 55
The doubts and ambiguities created by varying Section
4(2) interpretations caused pressure to be brought on the SEC
to develop objective guidelines for beleaguered practitioners
and issuers. The Commission responded in 1974 with Rule
146.56 The Rule created an independent, stand-alone private
52. See, e.g., Hill York Corp. v. Am. Int'l Franchises, Inc., 448 F. 2d 680,
688 n.6 (5th Cir. 1971) (limiting the exemption to persons having a "privi-
leged relationship with the issuer"); Lively v. Hirschfeld, 440 F. 2d 631, 632
(10th Cir. 1971) (stressing importance of examining "the particular capabili-
ties and information had by particular persons, buyers, plaintiffs, or offer-
ees."). But see, Doran v. Petroleum Mgmt. Corp., 545 F. 2d 893, 902 n.10
(5th Cir. 1977) ("We do not intimate that evidence of the offerees' sophisti-
cation is required in all cases to establish a private offering under Section
4(2).").
53. See I STUART R. COHN, SECURITIES COUNSELING FOR SMALL AND EMERG-
ING COMPANIES, 6-20 (2007) (West Supp. 2007) ("Section 4(2) cases often
involve multiple and interlocking problems of disclosure and offeree con-
cerns. What is missing is the pure case of (1) full disclosure, (2) given to
persons of ordinary backgrounds and intelligence, where (3) the exemption
is challenged solely on the basis that such persons did not possess sufficient
sophistication to be qualified investors.").
54. Committee on Federal Regulation of Securities, Position Papers Pri-
vate Exemption under Section 4(2) of the Securities Act of 1933, 31 Bus.
LAw. 483, 488 (1975).
55. See id. at 489 ("The issuer is now told that all of these factors have
something to do with whether he has an exemption under Section 4(2), but
he is never given a hint as to the proper proportions in the brew. The saving
recipe is kept secret, a moving target which he can never be sure he has
hit.").
56. Securities Act Release No. 5,487, 1974 WL 161966 (Apr. 23, 1974); 17
C.F.R. § 230.146 (1975). Rule 146 was replaced in 1980 by Rule 506, 17
C.F.R. § 230.506, see discussion infra Part III.
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offering exemption pursuant to the Commission's Section 19
rule-making authority.57 Rule 146 created clarity and benefits
in some areas, such as the concept of an "offeree representa-
tive" to act on behalf of a potential investor who might not
meet sophistication standards and the provision for alternative
disclosure requirements depending upon whether the issuer
was or was not a 1934 Exchange Act reporting company. Rule
146 nevertheless continued some of the most troublesome ele-
ments of the private offering exemption, such as the sophisti-
cation requirement and the rules against general solicitation
and general advertising. Rule 146 also imposed a numerical
limit of 35 purchasers, exclusive of a limited group of purchas-
ers including those purchasing at least $150,000 of the securi-
ties. 58
Rule 146 was replaced in 1980 by Rule 506, adopted by
the SEC as part of Regulation D. Rule 506 was a bit more is-
suer-friendly insofar as qualification standards focused solely
on purchasers, not offerees, 59 and a newly-defined type of pur-
chaser, the so-called "accredited investor," was not counted
within the numerical limit of 35 purchasers, was not required
to meet any "sophistication" standard, and was not required to
be given any of the otherwise obligatory disclosures. However,
Rule 506 continued (i) the requirement of "sophistication" for
non-accredited investors (who could employ purchaser repre-
sentatives to avoid this problem), (ii) the numerical limit of 35
non-accredited investors, (iii) the integration doctrine, (iv)
the potential loss of the exemption in the event of purchaser
resales, and, most onerously, (v) the prohibitions against gen-
eral advertising and solicitation. Indeed, Rule 506 was even
more harsh regarding solicitation than Rule 146. Rule 146 per-
mitted written communications to sophisticated offerees and
purchaser representatives if accompanied by an undertaking
to provide a full disclosure document upon request. 6° This
57. 1933 Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77s(a) (2005).
58. 17 C.F.R § 2 3 0. 1 4 6 (g) (1) (1975).
59. The "offeree representative" concept adopted in Rule 146 was re-
placed by a "purchaser representative" in Rule 506. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.146
(1975); 17 C.F.R. § 230.506 (1980).
60. 17 C.F.R. § 230.146(c) (1975) ("Neither the issuer nor any person
acting on its behalf shall offer... securities by means of any form of general
solicitation or general advertising, including but not limited to the following
.... (3) Any letter, circular, notice or other written communication, except
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sensible exception was eliminated from Rule 506, thus making
communication to even the most sophisticated potential inves-
tor a possible violation of the anti-solicitation provisions.
3. The Accredited Investor Exemption: Section 4(6)
Only one statutory registration exemption, Section 4(6),
has been added to the 1933 Act since its enactment.61 Section
4(6) was added as part of the Small Business Issuers Simplifica-
tion Act of 1980.62 Section 4(6) authorizes offers or sales up to
the Section 3(b) limit (currently $5 million) if made "solely to
one or more accredited investors" and there is no advertising
or public solicitation regarding the offering. Because Section
4(6) is subject to the same practical limitations as most of the
SEC's rules, particularly the monetary limitation, qualification
of investors, and the prohibition of general solicitation and ad-
vertising, Section 4(6) was not a useful exemption for small
businesses when adopted and has remained of little value or
consequence. 6
3
B. Regulatory Exemptions: Employing Section 3(b) Authority
The 1933 Securities Act granted authority to the Commis-
sion to adopt additional registration exemptions where the
Commission finds that: "enforcement of this title... is not nec-
essary in the public interest and for the protection of investors
by reason of the small amount involved or the limited charac-
ter of the public offering .... "64
that if paragraph (d) (1) of this section is satisfied as to each person the
communication is directed and the communication contains an undertaking
to provide the information specified by paragraph (e) (1) of this section on
request, such communication shall be deemed not to be a form of general
solicitation or general advertising.").
61. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77d(6) (2005).
62. Small Business Issuers' Simplification Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-477,
§ 602, 94 Stat. 2294 (1980).
63. By 1980, when Section 4(6) was adopted, the SEC had already cre-
ated Rule 146, a safe harbor for the private offering exemption. Despite Rule
146's limitations, it gave greater leeway for companies to market their securi-
ties than did the new Section 4(6) statutory exemption. Subsequent SEC
adoption of Rule 506, replacing Rule 146, slightly expanded the regulatory
private offering exemption and is far more useful to issuers than Section
4(6), as is Rule 505 adopted in 1980 under Regulation D. Securities Act of
1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77d(6) (2005).
64. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77c(b) (2005).
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The Commission's authority is limited to exemptions not
exceeding the statutory ceiling set in Section 3(b). The ceiling,
initially $100,000, has been amended several times and is cur-
rently $5 million. 65
1. The Golden Years: 1933-1953
The Federal Trade Commission, the federal securities reg-
ulator prior to the creation of the SEC in late 1934, wasted no
time in adopting exemptions for small issuers under its Sec-
tion 3(b) authority. Within months of adoption of the 1933
Securities Act, the FTC issued, repealed, and reissued a set of
rules establishing registration exemptions for limited stock of-
ferings, notes and bonds secured by first mortgages, certifi-
cates of deposit, fractional undivided interests in mineral
rights, and an entire set of regulations (Regulation B) regard-
ing the offer and sale of fractional interests in oil or gas
rights. 66 Several exemptions were consolidated in a November
1, 1933, FTC Release 67 which included a $100,000 exemption
based on the following conditions:
- cash transactions only;
- the $100,000 limit included prior issuances within 12
months;
- no prior issuances of the same class within 12 months
other than for cash;
- commissions not in excess of 10%; and
65. Congress raised the section 3(b) ceiling to $300,000 in 1945, to
$500,000 in 1970, to $1.5 million and then $2 million in 1978, and to $5
million in 1980. Given the pattern of raises, and the continued demand for
increased exemption opportunities, it is surprising that Congress has not
raised the Section 3(b) for over 25 years. The SEC requested that the ceiling
be raised to $10 million in 1992 but no congressional action was taken. Pres-
sure to raise the Section 3(b) ceiling has abated by reason of the 1996 addi-
tion of Section 28 to the 1933 Securities Act which grants broad authority to
the SEC to create exemptions "in the public interest" and has no monetary
limit. Although the SEC is now able to develop new or modify existing ex-
emptions for amounts in excess of the statutory Section 3(b) limit, it has
elected thus far to remain within those limits with regard to capital raising
exemptions.
66. A concise history of the early exemptions, initially known as Rules
202-210, can be found inJ. WILLIAM HicKs, EXEMPTED TRANSACTIONS UNDER
THE SECURITIES AcT OF 1933 7, §§ 6:1-3 (2nd ed. 2007).
67. See Securities Act Release No. 66, 1933 WL 28878 (Nov. 1, 1933).
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- stock units sold for not less than $100 each, and bond
units not less than $500.
In April 1934, the FTC added the following conditions to
this exemption:68
- a brief prospectus be given to the purchaser (other than
a regulated financial institution or insurance company)
describing the directors, shares, issuer's indebtedness,
salaries in excess of $6,000 per year, property transac-
tions with any company officers or other insiders, capital
assets, and royalty obligations; and
- a bold type statement on the cover of the prospectus
that "This stock has not been registered with the Federal
Trade Commission."
The April, 1934, Release also adopted an independent,
unconditional exemption for offers not exceeding $30,000.69
This unconditional exemption was based solely on the limited
offering amount. It lasted only six years and was the last time
the Commission created an unconditional exemption based
on the offering amount.
In 1938, the SEC added Rule 210,70 an exemption availa-
ble to any issuer (other than for oil and gas interests covered
under Regulation B) under the following conditions:
- sales were solely for cash;
- the $100,000 limit included prior issuances within 12
months;
- offers and sales complied with state securities laws;
- prior to any offers, issuer filed a notification to the SEC
stating the securities to be sold, the offering price, and
the states in which offers will be made; and
- prior to any use, issuer filed with the SEC ten copies of
any
- written communication proposed to be used at the of-
fering
- commencement or intended to be sent thereafter to
more than ten persons.
68. Securities Act Release No. 159, 1934 WL 28441 (Apr. 27, 1934).
69. See id. at *3.
70. Securities Act Release No. 1722, 1938 WL 32741 (Apr. 22, 1938).
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To summarize, within five years of the 1933 Securities
Act's adoption, three independent exemptions had been cre-
ated under Section 3(b) authority:
(1) A $100,000 exemption based upon a prospectus deliv-
ery;
(2) A $100,000 exemption based upon SEC notification
and compliance with state laws; and
(3) A $30,000 unconditional exemption.
Alas, if the SEC had only maintained such simplicity in its
regulations. There is not a single exemption in today's admin-
istrative panoply that provides as much freedom and leeway
for small buginesses. Today's set of highly technical, special-
ized exemptions are in stark contrast to the exemptions
adopted in the early days of federal regulation.
In 1940, the SEC repealed its prior exemptions and re-
placed them with a single exemption under the rubric of Reg-
ulation A. 71 The new exemption continued to be small busi-
ness friendly. Its only principal requirement (other than the
$100,000 ceiling) was that the issuer send a letter to the near-
est SEC regional office notifying the office of its intention to
sell, together with any selling literature it planned to use. The
notice only required the name of the issuer, its underwriter,
the shares to be sold, and a brief description of the intended
use of proceeds. There was no mandatory disclosure require-
ment for offerees or purchasers. Prior to any use, the issuer
was required to file with the SEC three copies of any written
communication proposed to be used at the commencement of
the offering or intended to be sent thereafter to more than ten
persons. Interestingly, the SEC stated that this new 1940 regu-
lation:
shifts the Commission's administrative emphasis
from the disclosure requirements of the Act to the
fraud prevention provisions. The examination proce-
dure which has been followed in the past will be
abandoned. The use of a prospectus is no longer re-
quired, although any selling literature which is em-
ployed must be forwarded to the appropriate Re-
gional office for its information. 72
71. Securities Act Release No. 2410, 1940 WL 7107 (Dec. 3, 1940).
72. Securities Act Release No. 2410, 1940 WL 7107 at *2 (Dec. 3, 1940).
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The policy and regulatory shift from disclosure review to
fraud prevention was conducive to small business capital for-
mation for it materially reduced technical, up front disclosure
requirements that were time-consuming and costly. It also re-
duced the chances of technical non-compliance with exemp-
tion requirements. Unfortunately, the Commission's an-
nounced philosophy was relatively short-lived.
2. Tightening the Screws
The year 1953 was a dark year for small business capital
formation. The first blow was a revised Regulation A that
shifted the SEC's prior emphasis from simplicity to formality.73
The new Regulation required a rather full disclosure docu-
ment (called the Offering Circular), complete with financial
statements prepared in accordance with generally accepted ac-
counting principles,74 filed and reviewed by the SEC in a man-
ner similar to the filing and review of registration statements.
Gone was the simple notification process. The new provisions
created a form of modified registration, the benefits of which
were very questionable in light of the Section 3(b) ceiling
(then at $300,000) and the fact that most states continued to
require (as they still do) that Regulation A offerings go
through the full state registration process. As noted by one
then-contemporary commentator, the Regulation A procedure
"has for the most part become too cumbersome and expensive
for small financings in an enterprise's early years."7 5
The second major blow was the Supreme Court's opinion
in SEC v. Ralston Purina Co.76 The opinion and its progeny of
administrative and judicial interpretations turned the Section
4(2) exemption from a relatively simple numerically-oriented
exemption into an exemption based on concepts of access to
73. Adoption of Revised Regulation A, Securities Act Release No. 3,466
1953 WL 5669 (Mar. 6, 1953).
74. Financial statements for a Regulation A offering are required to be
prepared in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles but
are not required to be audited unless the issuer already prepares audited
statements for other purposes. General Instructions, Regulation A Offering
Statement (Form 1-A), at 30.
75. Julian M. Meer, The Private Offering Exemption Under the Federal
Securities Act C A Study in Administrative and Judicial Contraction, 20 Sw.
L.J. 503, 504 (1966).
76. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119.
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information, disclosure, sophistication, and the elusive quality
of being able to "fend for oneself."77
With the doors of both Regulation A and the private offer-
ing exemption closing, substantial pressure was brought upon
the SEC to address the capital formation problems facing
smaller companies. The SEC responded by adopting Rule 257
to Regulation A in 1956, exempting offers up to $50,000 from
the public disclosure requirements of that exemption. 78 Rule
257 proved to be an exemption of limited practicality, given
the dual burdens of a low monetary ceiling and the continued
requirement for preparation of a disclosure document filed
with the SEC. The Rule 257 exemption was eliminated in
1992, the Commission noting that there had been only six
Rule 257 filings in the previous three years.79
In response to continuing pressure for enlargement of re-
gistration exemptions, the SEC adopted Rule 240 in 1975 for
offerings up to $100,000 by closely-held companies,80 and Rule
242 in 1980 for offerings up to the Section 3(b) maximum
monetary limit.81 These exemptions differed significantly from
the pre-Regulation A exemptions by imposing enlarged, tech-
nical requirements for qualification. Although Rules 240 and
242 were eliminated and replaced in their entirety in 1982 by
77. See supra text accompanying note 50.
78. Adoption of Revised Regulation A and the Consolidation Therein of
Regulation D, Securities Act Release No. 3,663, 1956 WL 7217 (July 23,
1956). The issuer was relieved from preparing and delivering to prospective
purchasers an Offering Circular but was required to submit to the SEC a
statement (other than financials) equivalent to the offering circular. The
$50,000 limit was raised to $100,000 in 1978. Rule 257 was not available to
issuers incorporated or organized within one year prior to the date of filing
the notification that had not had a net income from operations or to issuers
incorporated or organized more than one year prior to such date that not
had a net income from operations one of the last two fiscal years.
79. Small Business Initiatives, Securities Act Release No. 6,949, Exchange
Act Release No. 30,968, Trust Indenture Act Release No. 2,287, Financial
Reporting Release No. 38, 51 SEC Docket 2154, 1992 WL 188930 (July 30,
1992).
80. Notice of Adoption of Rule 240 Under the Securities Act of 1933 B
"Exemption of Certain Limited Offers and Sales by Closely Held Issuers",
Securities Act Release No. 5,560, 6 SEC Docket 132, 1975 WL 160968 (Jan.
24, 1975).
81. Exemption of Limited Offers and Sales by Qualified Issuers, Securi-
ties Act Release No. 6,180, 19 SEC Docket 295, 1980 WL 29335 (Jan. 17,
1980).
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Journal of Law and Business
HeinOnline  -- 4 N.Y.U. J. L. & Bus. 29 2007-2008
NYU JOURNAL OF LAW AND BUSINESS
Regulation D,82 they set the stage for the detailed and onerous
provisions that characterize today's administrative exemptions.
Regulation D is a comprehensive set of rules applicable in
varying degrees to three separate exemptions contained within
the Regulation: Rule 504 for offerings up to $1 million; Rule
505 for offerings up to $5 million; and Rule 506 (replacing
Rule 146) for private offerings regardless of the monetary
amount offered. Provisions applicable in varying degrees to
each of the three exemptions include accredited investor qual-
ifications, integration standards, aggregation limitations,
prohibitions against general solicitation and advertising, impo-
sition of restricted securities status, specific disclosure require-
ments for non-accredited investors, numerical limitations on
non-accredited investors, SEC filing requirements, and "un-
worthy issuer" (also known as "bad boy") disqualification pro-
visions for certain issuers.8 3 The apparent simplicity of each of
the Regulation D exemptions is lost once one begins to en-
graft the other applicable portions of Regulation D. Regula-
tion D remains the principal source of regulatory exemptions
utilized by companies today, although statistics do not suggest
widespread utilization by small companies. 84
3. The SEC's August 2007 Proposals
In August 2007, the SEC announced a proposed series of
measures "to clarify and modernize our rules to bring them
into line with the realities of modern market practice and
communications technologies without compromising investor
protection."8 5 The proposals are limited to the Regulation D
82. Regulation D - Revision of Certain Exemptions from Registration
under the Securities Act of 1933 for Transactions Involving Limited Offers
and Sales, Securities Act Release No. 6,389, 24 SEC Docket 1166, 1982 WL
35662 (Mar. 8, 1982). See also 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.501-06 (1982).
83. See infra Part III for detailed discussion of the problems facing small
companies by reason of these exemption requirements.
84. See infra text accompanying note 203 regarding Regulation D utiliza-
tion.
85. See Revisions of Limited Offering Exemptions in Regulation D, Secur-
ities Act Release No. 8,828, 2007 SEC LEXIS 1730, at *6 (Aug. 3, 2007). The
SEC had announced its intention to issue such proposals in May 2007, not-
ing at the time that the proposals would "modernize and improve [the] capi-
tal raising and reporting requirements for smaller companies." Press Re-
lease, SEC, Proposed Modernization of Smaller Company Capital-Raising
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set of exemptions and include the following principal compo-
nents:
- a new exemption, Rule 507 of Regulation D, for sales of
securities to a newly defined category of "large accred-
ited investors," for which the issuer could engage in lim-
ited advertising; 86
- revisions to the accredited investor qualifications that (i)
add an investments-owned standard to the current total
assets and net worth standards and (ii) provide for infla-
tionary adjustments to the earnings and assets stan-
dards;
8 7
- a reduced integration safe harbor for Regulation D of-
ferings from six months to 90 days;8 8 and
- a uniform disqualification provision for all Regulation D
offerings.89
Despite the SEC's announced intention to facilitate capi-
tal-formation by smaller businesses, the August 2007 proposals
fall far short of this goal. The principal proposal, Rule 507, is a
small step in the right direction insofar as it will permit "lim-
ited advertising" for a defined set of "large accredited inves-
tors" investors. However, the pool of potential investors acces-
sible by small companies is likely to be very small. "Large ac-
credited investors" are the same entities and individuals as
current accredited investors, with added qualifications." For
and Disclosure Requirements (May 23, 2007), http://www.sec.gov/news/
press/2007/2007-102.htm.
86. See id. at *9 (proposed § 230.507 Exemption for Limited Offers and
Sales to Large Accredited Investors). The current contents of Rule 507 of
Regulation D will be moved into the proposed Rule 502(e).
87. See id. at *107-10 (proposed amendment to § 230.501 (a) Definitions
and Terms Used in Regulation D).
88. See id. at *8 (proposed amendment to § 230.502(a) General Condi-
tions to Be Met, Integration).
89. See id. at *64 (proposed § 230.502(e) Disqualification Provisions).
The proposal would modify and apply the "unworthy issuer" disqualification
provisions currently found only in Rule 505 to all Regulation D offerings.
This proposal is long overdue, as there seems little reason to differentiate
among the exemptions with regard to application of "unworthy issuer" stan-
dards.
90. 17 C.F.R. § 230.501 (a) (5) (2007). For individual investors - the most
likely group of potential investors for small companies - the current accred-
ited investor standard under Rule 501 (a) is a $1 million net worth (which
could be joined with the individual's spouse) or an annual income in excess
of $200,000 ($300,000 when joined with a spouse). To qualify as a "large
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small companies with limited histories and resources, the
"large accredited investor" pool of potential investors is even
more constricted than the current standards for accredited in-
vestors. Indeed, the SEC noted in its Release that the pool of
large accredited investors is 1.64% of U.S. households, com-
pared to 8.47% that qualify as ordinary accredited investors.91
The pool of potential investors for the new Rule 507 exemp-
tion would therefore be approximately 80% less than the cur-
rent pool of Rule 506 investors, a result that is difficult to re-
gard as an improved marketing capacity for smaller companies
even with the possibility of limited advertising.
The limited advertising provisions for proposed Rule 507
substantially mirror the bare-bones "tombstone" advertising
provisions of Rule 135c applicable to unregistered offerings by
public-reporting companies.92 The constraints are quite se-
vere. The description of the business, which is the most impor-
tant information for would-be investors, must be limited to 25
words. One must wonder what the chances are that a small,
unknown company will pique the interest of potential inves-
tors in 25 words or less. The advertising is limited to written
form. However, the issuer or issuer's agent may also provide
orally or in writing additional information about the company
and its offering directly to a potential investor if there is a rea-
sonable belief that the potential purchaser is a large accred-
ited investor. For most small companies and their agents, the
accredited investor" for Rule 507 purposes, the individual would be required
to own more than $2.5 million in investments or have an annual income of
more than $400,000 ($600,000 with one's spouse). The August 2007 Release
also proposes to amend this qualification by inserting, as an alternative to
the $1 million net worth standard, an investments-owned standard of
$750,000. Individuals also qualify as accredited investors if they are a direc-
tor, executive officer, or general partner of the issuer, without being subject
to the income or asset standards. 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a)(4) (2007).
91. See id. at *15. The percentage figures were estimates based on Fed-
eral Reserve Board of Governors, Survey of Consumer Finances, 2004.
92. 17 C.F.R. § 230.135(c) (2007) (Notice of Certain Proposed Unregis-
tered Offerings). In addition to basic information regarding the issuer's
name and address, brief description of the securities being offered and the
offering amount, the notice for Rule 507 can also contain a brief description
of the issuer's business, limited to 25 words, a description of "large accred-
ited investors" and any suitability or minimum investment standards the is-
suer might impose.
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pool of known large accredited investors is assuredly a limited
one.
A principal, important benefit granted by proposed Rule
507 is that, like Rule 506, the offering will preempt state regis-
tration and exemption requirements. "Large accredited inves-
tors" will be considered as "qualified purchasers" under Sec-
tion 18(b) (3) of the 1933 Act, thereby providing "covered se-
curity" status and the resulting federal preemption of state
registration and exemption laws.93 As discussed below, we be-
lieve that a much broader preemption in favor of federal ex-
emptions should be developed. Rule 507 would add one more
element to the preemption fold, but the Rule's narrow condi-
tions and practical limitations make the preemption factor rel-
atively unimportant to small companies.
In sum, while proposed Rule 507 adds to the panoply of
registration exemptions, it will do little for companies not able
to finance themselves from angel-type investors who are within
the "large accredited investor" definition. The proposed Rule
does not expand opportunities for companies that need to
market their securities to a broad class of potential investors.
The proposed reduction of the integration safe harbor
from six months to 90 days94 is also a step in the right direc-
tion, but here, too, the step is modest and does not adequately
address the financing needs of small companies. The proposal
is limited to Regulation D and thus does not assuage the inte-
gration concerns relative to Section 4(2) or the intrastate of-
fering exemptions. Nor does it address the aggregation con-
cerns that apply to Rules 504 and 505. 95 More fundamentally,
the proposal retains the basic integration concept that can act
as a major impediment to small business financing. We believe
that the integration doctrine should not be applied to discrete
offerings that otherwise satisfy exemption conditions. If a safe
93. August 2007 Release, proposed amendment to Rule 146, Rules
Under Section 18 of the Act, defining the term "qualified purchaser" for
purposes of Section 18(b) (3) of the 1933 Act to mean any large accredited
investor as defined in Rule 501(k) of Regulation D. Qualified purchasers are
within the list of "covered securities" offerings that the National Securities
Markets Improvement Act of 1996 (NSMIA) preempts from state registra-
tion and exemption requirements. National Securities Markets Improve-
ment Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-290, § 18(b), 110 Stat. 3416, 3418 (1996).
94. See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
95. See infra notes 147-151 (discussion of aggregation).
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harbor time frame is deemed essential by the SEC, then the
safe harbor should be reduced to no more than 30 days.96 The
SEC's proposed 90-day safe harbor period effectively limits a
company to one offering in a six month period. If, for exam-
ple, a company sells securities on July 1, the 90-day "clean" pe-
riod on each end dates from the beginning of April and
stretches to the end of September. Any other securities offered
or sold during that six-month period will be subject to the five-
factor integration test, a test that for small companies in con-
tinual need of working capital may well result in the integra-
tion of offerings.
The SEC's announced proposals fail to address the princi-
pal financing concerns of small companies. Nearly all existing
technical requirements for registration exemptions remain in
place, including prohibitions against advertising and solicita-
tion, the integration doctrine, numerical limitations for Rules
505 and 506, and the loss of otherwise valid exemptions as a
result of resales by purchasers beyond the control of issuers.97
Perhaps some comfort can be taken from the fact that the SEC
has at last begun to consider capital-raising concerns of
smaller businesses. Unfortunately, however, the August 2007
Release continues a long-term pattern of avoidance of address-
ing major problem areas.
To summarize, today's potpourri of statutory and adminis-
trative registration exemptions are as follows:
Intrastate Private Offering Administrative Accredited Investor
Section 3(a)(11) Section 4(2) Regulation A Section 4(6)98
Rule 147 Rule 506 Rule 504
Rule 505
96. See infra Part V (Recommendations for Reform for recommendations
on integration and other concerns).
97. The August 2007 Release not only continues the "restricted securi-
ties" status for Regulation D sales, the SEC stated that it is considering en-
larging the realm by adding to the restricted securities list shares sold in a
Rule 504 offering pursuant to a state-accredited investor exemption. See Revi-
sions of Limited Offering Exemptions in Regulation D, Securities Act Re-
lease No. 8,828, 2007 SEC LEXIS 1730, at *75 (Aug. 3, 2007).
98. There is an additional regulatory exemption, the so-called
"California Exemption" contained in Rule 1001, that is tied to the accredited
investor concept. 17 C.F.R. § 230.1001 (2007), Small Business Registration
Exemption, Securities Act Release No. 7,285 [1995-1996 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 85,803 (May 1, 1996). In 1996, the SEC took the
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The uninitiated may find this to be an impressive list -
eight distinct exemptions, and nine with the addition of pro-
posed Rule 507. Surely a small company can find hope and
relief in one or more of these exemptions. Or so one would
think. That is, until examination reveals the difficulties, traps,
and potential liabilities inherent in each. We now move to that
examination.
III.
PART III: PUrING ON THE SQUEEZE: THE PROBLEMATIC
FEDERAL EXEMPTION REQUIREMENTS
Despite the existence of at least eight, and perhaps nine
(counting the proposed Rule 507), registration exemptions,
small companies are hard pressed to find an exemption consis-
tent with their timing, financing, and marketing needs. The
technical requirements within each exemption are justifiable if
clearly tied to investor protection, but that connection is dubi-
ous at best and appears entirely lacking in some instances. The
following is a discussion of the principal problem areas facing
small companies under the current exemption scheme.
unusual step of creating a federal exemption dependent on compliance with
a state exemption, in particular the California exemption set forth in section
25102(n) of the California Corporations Code. CAL. CORP. CODE § 25102(n)
(West 1968). The California exemption is limited to $5 million, companies
must be organized in or have a majority of property, sales, payroll, and
voting securities in California, sales can only be made to a qualified group
analogous (but not identical) to Regulation D accredited investors, a
disclosure document must be given to certain of the lower-scale qualified
purchasers, and the securities are restricted on resale. The SEC announced
that it will create a similar federal exemption for any state that adopts
standards equivalent to California. To date no state has taken up that offer.
The exemption is not viewed favorably because of such conditions as the
intrastate nature of the issuer, disclosure requirements, monetary ceiling,
suitability requirements, and resale limitations. Although the exemption
permits a limited form of general solicitation, this factor alone has not led to
adoption of similar exemptions in other states. A number of states have
adopted the Model Accredited Investor Exemption. Although that state
exemption does not enjoy federal status, it has fewer restrictions than the
California exemption. Rule 1001 therefore has not created significant
exemption opportunities for small businesses.
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A. Advertising and Solicitation
There is no greater impediment to the ability of small
companies to raise capital under the securities laws than the
SEC rules against general solicitation and advertising. The
SEC has imposed severe limitations on marketing securities to
prospective investors in private offerings under Section 4(2),99
and in Rule 504, 505, and 506 offerings under Regulation
D. 100 The only exemptions not subject to such limitations are
the intrastate exemption and Regulation A, both of which gen-
erally require state registration if the offerings are widely mar-
keted. 101 Inasmuch as smaller companies generally seek to
99. Letter of General Counsel Discussing the Factors to be Considered in
Determining the Availability of the Exemption from Registration Provided
by the Second Clause of Section 4(1), Securities Act Release No. 285 Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 2740 (Jan. 24, 1935) (". . .transactions which are ef-
fected by direct negotiation by the issuer are much more likely to be non-
public than those effected through the use of the machinery of public distri-
bution.").
100. 17 CFR 230.502(c): "Except as provided in §230.504(b)(1), neither
the issuer nor any person acting on its behalf shall offer or sell the securities
by any form of general solicitation or general advertising, including, but not
limited to, the following:
(1) Any advertisement, article, notice or other communication published in
any newspaper, magazine, or similar media or broadcast over television or
radio; and
(2) Any seminar or meeting whose attendees have been invited by any gen-
eral solicitation or general advertising;
Provided, however, that publication by an issuer of a notice in accordance
with §230.135c shall not be deemed to constitute general solicitation or gen-
eral advertising for purposes of this section ...."
The reference to Rule 504(b) (1) is the exception for issuers in a Rule 504
offering that has been state registered or is being made under a state accred-
ited investor exemption. The exception noted under Rule 135(c) refers to
"tombstone" type notices of unregistered offerings by companies subject to
the 1934 Act reporting requirements.
101. The intrastate and Regulation A exemptions also contain marketing
limitations. Intrastate offerings cannot be made, inadvertently or otherwise,
to any non-resident, even if that non-resident does not become a purchaser.
This harsh result is a major impediment to the use of the intrastate exemp-
tion. Regulation A allows for "testing the waters" with a limited disclosure
document given to prospective investors prior to the filing of the Regulation
A offering circular, but this limited form of solicitation is not allowed in
most states unless the offering is first registered in that state. Proposed Rule
507 would allow a limited form of advertising to a defined group of "large
accredited investors." The practical limitations inherent in proposed Rule
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raise capital through exempt rather than registered offerings,
the SEC limitations on advertising and solicitation apply to the
registration exemptions most likely to be utilized.
The genesis of the prohibitions against general advertis-
ing and general solicitation has two bases, both of which are
reflected in the initial interpretive release on the private offer-
ing exemption, in which the SEC's general counsel discussed
both the concept of "offer" and the manner of making such an
offer. 10 2 As to the former, the General Counsel opined that:
The word 'offering' in this sense should not be lim-
ited to those cases wherein a formal proposal for a
firm commitment is submitted. Any attempt to dis-
pose of a security should be regarded as an offer....
Any such preliminary negotiations or conversations
with a substantial number of prospective purchasers
would, in my opinion, cause the offering in question
to be a public offering .... 103
With regard to the manner of offering, the opinion
stated:
the purpose of the exemption of non-public offerings
is largely limited to those cases wherein the issuer
desires to consummate a few transactions with partic-
ular persons. Consequently, I feel that transactions
which are effected by direct negotiation by the issuer
507 are discussed in the text at notes 90-92. A major hidden problem with
the Rule 507 advertising provision is the possibility that the issuer who is
unable to find sufficient investors in a Rule 507 offering must thereafter sus-
pend any alternative Regulation D or private offering for at least six months
(or three months if the Regulation D integration safe harbor is so reduced)
to avoid an integration problem with respect to the prohibition against gen-
eral advertising.
102. Letter of General Counsel discussing the factors to be considered in
determining the availability of the exemption from registration provided by
the second clause of Section 4(1), Securities Act Release No. 285 Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 1 2740 (Jan. 24, 1935). For a full discussion of the prohibitions
against general advertising and solicitation, see, e.g., Stuart R. Cohn, Securi-
ties Markets for Small Issuers: The Barrier of Federal Solicitation and Advertising
Prohibitions, 38 FLA. L. Riv. 1 (1986); Patrick Daugherty, Rethinking the Ban on
General Solicitation, 38 EMORY LJ. 67 (1989).
103. Letter of General Counsel Discussing the Factors to be Considered in
Determining the Availability of the Exemption from Registration Provided
by the Second Clause of Section 4(1), Securities Act Release No. 285, Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 2740 (Jan.24, 1935).
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are much more likely to be non-public than those ef-
fected through the use of the machinery of public
distribution.104
While the quoted statements can be formally supported
by statutory language, it must be asked whether the breadth of
the interpretations is necessitated by investor protection con-
cerns rather than formalistic doctrine. The starting point is the
question of what constitutes an "offer" under the 1933 Securi-
ties Act. The statute defines an offer to include "every attempt
or offer to dispose of, or solicitation of an offer to buy" a secur-
ity. 10 5 This definition is ambiguous at best. If one thinks in
terms of contract law, an offer at common law conveys the ma-
terial terms of the proposed agreement.10 6 An offer for con-
tract law purposes would not include an invitation to a pro-
spective purchaser to receive information regarding a pro-
posed transaction. An offer implies a proposal that may be
accepted. Reference to a potential transaction without delinea-
tion of the material terms or the opportunity for a unilateral,
binding commitment is not an offer capable of forming ipso
facto the contract terms. Although the 1933 Securities Act's use
of the term "offer" could readily be interpreted in a contract
sense, the SEC has interpreted the provision to encompass
statements or notices that fall far short of normal contractual
concepts. 10 7 The SEC has successfully prosecuted its position
in several instances, 08 although all of the cases involved solici-
104. Id.
105. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77(b)(3).
106. "An offer, capable of being converted into an agreement by accept-
ance, must consist of a definite promise to be bound provided that certain
specified terms are accepted .... He must not merely have been feeling his way
towards an agreement, not merely initiating negotiations from which an agreement
might or might not in time result." G.C. CHESIRES & C.H.S. FIFOOT, TiE LAW OF
CoNTRAcT 26 (6th ed. 1964) (emphasis added).
107. Publication of Information Prior to or After Effective Date of Regis-
tration Statement, Securities Act Release No. 3,844 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
1 3250 (Oct. 8. 1957) ("It apparently is not generally understood, however,
that the publication of information and statements, and publicity efforts,
generally, made in advance of a proposed financing, although not couched
in terms of an express offer, may in fact contribute to conditioning the pub-
lic mind or arousing public interest in the issuer or in the securities of an
issuer in a manner which raises a serious question whether the publicity is
not in fact part of the selling effort.").
108. Diskin v. Lomasney & Co., 452 F.2d 871, 875 (2d Cir. 1971) (broker-
dealer's written promise to sell plaintiff 5,000 shares of Continental Travel,
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tation of specific transactions that were well beyond simple ad-
vertisements or requests for further information. Imposing
the protections of the securities laws on negotiations that are
short of a formal contractual commitment is justifiable, for
there is legitimate concern that pre-registration announce-
ments, publicity, and notices could "condition the market for
the securities that [promoters] are trying to sell." )9 This con-
cern is the principal basis for the Commission's gun-jumping
rules and mandatory "quiet period" prior to the filing of a re-
gistration statement," 0 and the SEC has successfully brought
remedial actions where promoters have publicized specific of-
fering information or made value-laden judgments regarding
as-yet to be registered offerings.'"I However, in one of the few
reported cases in this area, the Second Circuit indicated that
some "line drawing" was appropriate and that th amount of
information provided would be important to determine
Ltd., unaccompanied by any preliminary prospectus, if plaintiff would
purchase 1,000 registered shares of Ski Park City West constituted an "offer"
under the Securities Act); SEC v. Cavanagh, 155 F.3d 129, 135 (2d Cir.
1998) (negotiations for the sale of securities conditional on the closing of a
merger transaction constituted an "offer"); SEC v. Commercial Inv. & Dev.
Corp. of Fla., 373 F. Supp. 1153, 1164 (S.D. Fla. 1974) (letter to existing
shareholders advising of proposed public offering and asking for commit-
ments to purchase shares prior to registration constituted an "offer"); Dam-
son Oil Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec.
L. Rep. (CCH) 1 79,916 (July 5, 1974) (advertisement making no reference
to specific offering but asking for response from readers who "want to find
out more" regarded by SEC as improper first step in offering process); Ger-
ald F. Gerstenfeld, SEC No-Action Letter, 1985 Lexis No-Act. 2790 (Dec. 3,
1985) (general advertisement by syndicator of limited partnerships asking
readers to call or write for more information regarded as offer even if no
current offerings exist but future ones are planned).
109. SEC v. Thomas D. Kienlen Corp., 755 F. Supp. 936, 940 (D. Or. 1991)
(citing SEC brief in action against promoter of mutual fund who held meet-
ings and passed out brochures to potential investors prior to registration).
110. See, e.g., Rule 163A, Exemption from Section 5(c) of the Act for Cer-
tain Communications Made By or on Behalf of Issuers More Than 30 Days
Before a Registration Statement is Filed, 17 C.F.R. § 230.163A (2005).
111. See, e.g., Chris-Craft Indus. v. Bangor Punta Corp., 426 F.2d 569, 574
(2d Cir. 1970) (pre-registration press release stating price of shares to be
offered); SEC v. Arvida Corp., 169 F. Supp. 211, 214 (S.D.N.Y. 1958) (press
conference answered reporters' questions regarding proposed offering, in-
cluding proposed offering price per share); Kienlen, 755 F. Supp. at 938-39
(pre-registration notices, meetings, brochures and postcards extolling vir-
tues of to-be-formed mutual fund).
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whether an offer has been made under the Act. 112 Unfortu-
nately, the "line-drawing" dictum has been ignored by the
SEC, whose staff has concluded that even nondescript general
notices of a securities offering that simply invite interested per-
sons to apply for more information is an "offer" within the
meaning of the Act.113 This SEC position, formalized in the
specific prohibition in Rule 502(c) against "[a]ny advertise-
ment, article, notice, or other communication published in
any newspaper, magazine, or similar media. .. " was adopted
without any findings justifying how a general announcement
could "pre-condition" the market, affect investor decisions, or
otherwise undermine investor protection. One is hard pressed
to understand how a notice in a newspaper that a company is
planning or engaged in an offering of securities, and that in-
vites readers to request a copy of the private placement memo-
randum, rises to the level of an "offer" by the company, or a
solicitation of an offer from an unidentified member of the
public. Even if the Commission believes that the 1933 Securi-
ties Act could be read so broadly, there is no impediment to the
Commission adopting a reasonable interpretation that allows
limited notices and advertisements of the fact of an offer-
ing.114
112. Chris Craft Indus., 426 F. 2d at 574 ("When it is announced that secur-
ities will be sold at some date in the future and, in addition, an attractive
description of these securities and of the issuer is furnished, it seems clear
that such an announcement provides much the same kind of information as
that contained in a prospectus .... Doubtless the line drawn between an announce-
ment containing sufficient information to constitute an offer and one which does not
must to some extent be arbitrary." (Emphasis added).
113. Damson Oil Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, [1974-1975 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 79,916 (July 5, 1974) (advertisement
making no reference to specific offering but asking for response from read-
ers who "want to find out more" regarded by SEC as improper first step in
offering process); Gerald F. Gerstenfeld, SEC No-Action Letter, 1985 SEC
No-Act. Lexis 2790 (Dec. 3, 1985) (general advertisement by syndicator of
limited partnerships asking readers to call or write for more information
regarded as offer even if no current offerings exist but future ones are
planned).
114. So-called "tombstone advertisements" permitted under certain SEC
rules apply only to registered offerings (Rule 135) or unregistered offerings
by 1934 Act reporting companies (Rule 135(c)). There is no provision al-
lowing limited public announcements for unregistered private or Regulation
D offerings by non-reporting companies.
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A second major problem with the SEC's anti-solicitation
doctrine is the breadth applied to the term "general solicita-
tion." No one should dispute that a limited exempt offering
should not be conducted on street corners or through sub-
scription documents in airline magazines. But the SEC has
adopted an almost equally polar position by interpreting "gen-
eral solicitation" to include offers to any person with whom the
issuer, or issuer's agent, has not had a prior relationship. 115 To
make matters worse, i.e. to further constrict the range of po-
tential offerees, the SEC staff has stated that the pre-existing
relationship must be one that provides issuer or issuer's agent
with knowledge as to the offeree's sophistication or financial
circumstances. 116 Even if an offering is directed only to a
known group of accredited investors, the anti-solicitation rules
115. See, e.g., Kenman Corp., Exchange Act Release. No. 21,962 [1984-
1985 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 83,767 (Apr. 19, 1985)
(administrative proceeding finding violation of anti-solicitation rules for Sec-
tion 4(2) and Rule 506 where solicitations went to persons "with no preexist-
ing relationship to the offeror.") Id. at 87,428, n.6; Texas Investor Newslet-
ter, SEC No-Action Letter, 1984 SEC No-Act. Lexis 1582 (Jan. 23, 1984)
(mailing of over 200 brochures to broker-dealers, investment advisers, attor-
neys and accountants, along with statement that no offer would be made
without delivery of private placement memorandum, violated anti-solicita-
tion rules); David B.H. Martin,Jr. & L. Keith Parsons, The Pre-existing Relation-
ship Doctrine Under Regulation D: A Rule Without Reason, 45 WASH. & LEE L.
REv. 1031, 1044 (1988) ("The staffs interpretive letters under Rule 502(c)
indicated that the staff believes a pre-existing relationship between the issuer
or its agents and offerees to be an almost absolute prerequisite to avoiding
general solicitation in a Regulation D offering.").
116. Mineral Lands Research & Marketing Corp., SEC No-Action Letter,
1985 WL 55694, at *1 (November 4, 1985) ("That question concerns the
application of Rule 502(c) to the Company's proposal to offer securities to
persons with whom officers and directors of the Company have prior busi-
ness relationships.... The types of relationships with offerees that may be
important in establishing that a general solicitation has not taken place are
those that would enable the issuer (or a person acting on its behal) to be aware of the
financial circumstances or sophistication of the persons with whom the relationship
exists or that otherwise are of some substance and duration." (emphasis added)).
Even if an offering is directed to persons with whom the issuer has a pre-
existing relationship, such as customers, that relationship might not be suffi-
cient in the absence of investor qualification information. Tog Shop, SEC
No-Action Letter, [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] Fed Sec L Rep (CCH)
81,192 (no-action letter denied for introductory letters to selected principal
customers to obtain expressions of interest in receiving offering prospectus).
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will have been violated in the absence of a pre-existing rela-
tionship. 1 17
The SEC's proscriptions against advertising and solicita-
tion are difficult to justify as to breadth and purpose. The stat-
utory basis is ambiguous at best, and SEC staff interpretations
have no apparent linkage to investor protection. Who or how
one is approached with regard to an offering should be of lit-
tle importance compared to the quality of information given
to a prospective investor and the ability of that investor to un-
derstand the merits and risks of the offering. The strict prohi-
bition against general advertising and solicitation appears to
have little relationship to protecting an individual investor. If a
potential investor is given adequate disclosure and has the ca-
pacity to evaluate the merits, why should the issuer be required
to have a pre-existing relationship with the investor? Indeed,
general advertising and solicitation are permitted for intrastate
offerings, for state-registered Rule 504 offerings, for Regula-
tion A offerings, and of course for registered offerings. In
none of those instances is there any qualification as to relation-
ship or concern regarding the investor's capacity to evaluate
the offering's merits.' 18 Why should the limitations exist for
private and Regulation D offerings? What "investor protec-
tion" goal is satisfied by demanding a pre-existing relationship
to the issuer? One may even turn the tables on this require-
ment, suggesting that a pre-existing relationship creates a
greater danger of over-reliance on the issuer's promoters, as
evidenced by the affinity frauds among church groups and
other organizations.' 19
The advertising and solicitation proscriptions have been a
constant source of concern and the subject of reform recom-
mendations expressed year after year by participants in the
117. Securities Act Release No. 6,455, 1983 WL 409415 (Mar. 3, 1983), Q.
60, 1983 WL 409415, at *1 ("The mere fact that a solicitation is directed only
to accredited investors will not mean that the solicitation is in compliance
with Rule 502(c). Rule 502(c) relates to the nature of the offering, not the
nature of the offerees.").
118. Intrastate offerings are of course limited to state residents, but that
can hardly be thought of as creating any kind of relationship qualification.
119. See, e.g. Affinity Fraud: How To Avoid Investment Scams That Target
Groups, SEC Report (modified Sept. 6, 2006), available at http://www.sec.
gov/investor/pubs/affinity.htm ("These scams exploit the trust and friend-
ship that exist in groups of people who have something in common.").
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SEC's Government Small Business Forum, 120 yet for 25 years
the Commission has not responded to the criticism or pro-
vided a single bit of evidentiary basis that its rules are worthy of
retention. The shackles placed on small businesses by these
rules prevent the effective marketing of securities and place
small companies under enormous risk of liability should the
offering process creep even accidentally into forbidden
grounds.' 21 While the CEO of a smaller issuer may present
her business strategy and future plans to a chamber of com-
merce audience or a business networking forum, if she in-
cludes too much detail in the discussion of financing that
growth, she may forfeit the exemption from registration. The
rigidity of the exemption rules unnecessarily draws a straight
line from business promotion to a potential offer of a security
when the regulatory focus should be on the actual purchase of
the security. The in terrorem impact of these rules hang over
small companies that do not have personal acquaintance with
sufficient investors to raise significant amounts of capital and
are unable to interest brokers to assist in their limited scale
offerings. The prohibitions choke off and invalidate ordinary
and reasonable communications between entrepreneurs and
potential investors and stop potentially beneficial offerings
dead in their tracks.
B. Numerical Limitations
Rules 505 and 506 both impose a limit of 35 non-accred-
ited investors. There is no limit on the number of accredited
investors, but the ability of smaller companies to access accred-
ited investors (especially given the advertising and solicitation
prohibitions) and obtain substantial capital from them will
often be quite limited. As a result, the ceiling of 35 non-ac-
120. See supra note 1 and accompanying text with reference to the annual
SEC-sponsored forum.
121. The SEC has indicated that a single inadvertent solicitation might not
violate Rule 502(c). Securities Act Release No. 6,825 [1988-1989 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 84,404, at 80,047 (Mar. 14, 1989) ("if an
offering is structured so that only persons with whom the issuer and its
agents have had a prior relationship are solicited, the fact that one potential
investor with whom there is no such prior relationship is called may not
necessarily result in a general solicitation."). One wonders whether the SEC
seriously considered the implicit indications arising from its reference to
"one potential investor."
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credited investors can be a substantial restriction. A small com-
pany seeking to raise, for example, $2 million through a Rule
505 offering, would need to average approximately $57,000
per non-accredited investor, less amounts invested by accred-
ited investors. This is a daunting task for companies that do
not have ready access to accredited investors. Proposed Rule
507 does not have a numerical limitation, but that offering
must be limited to so-called "large accredited investors," an
even smaller group than ordinary accredited investors.' 22
The number 35 has no statutory basis. At one time a gen-
eral notion persisted that a private offering was confined to a
25-30 person range,' 23 but that notion was exploded by the
Supreme Court's declaration in Ralston Purina that there was
no numerical test for a private offering.124 Exemptions for lim-
ited offerings adopted shortly after enactment of the 1933 leg-
islation contained no numerical limits on purchasers. 25 The
35-purchaser limitation first appeared in Rule 146, the SEC's
regulatory private offering exemption adopted in 1974.126 The
Commission's succinct explanation of the numerical limita-
tion was that it was "consistent" with the limited manner of
offering proscriptions as well as serving "to assure that the
transaction does not involve or result in a deferred distribu-
tion." 27 How the number 35 was selected was not revealed,
but the figure has remained sacrosanct to this day with regard
to non-accredited investors. Violation of the numerical limita-
tion is specifically excluded from the "insignificant deviations"
provisions of Rule 508, further sanctifying this arbitrary limita-
tion.128
122. The SEC has estimated that the proposed set of "large accredited
investors" would be approximately 80% less than ordinary accredited inves-
tors as defined in Regulation D. See discussion supra note 85.
123. Orrick, supra note 45, at 33.
124. 346 U.S. 119 at 125 ("The Commission would have us go one step
further and hold that 'an offering to a substantial number of the public' is
not exempt .... But there is no warrant for superimposing a quantity limit
on private offerings as a matter of statutory interpretation.").
125. See supra notes 66-72 and accompanying text.
126. Notice of Adoption of Rule 146, Transactions by an Issuer Deemed
Not to Involve Any Public Offering, 39 Fed. Reg. 15,261 (S.E.C. May 2,
1974).
127. Id.
128. Rule 240, adopted in 1975 for offerings up to $100,000 and replaced
by Regulation D in 1982, had no limitation on the number of purchasers but
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There also are a number of practical problems presented
by the 35 person limitation. For example, investors routinely,
for tax and estate planning purposes, desire to purchase stock
in the names of their children, grandchildren, or other family
members. Unless such intended beneficiaries are themselves
accredited investors, which is often unlikely, or are living
within the same principal residence as the investor, purchases
in their names will count against the numerical limit.' 29 This
result requires the parent or other relative to purchase all of
the shares individually and to make transfers to the intended
beneficiaries at a later date. Even if the SEC would not con-
sider this two-step process as a violation of the numerical limi-
tations, a process that requires such subterfuge has no rational
justification except to stay within an arbitrary 35 person limita-
tion. Another example involves employees who have not yet
accumulated sufficient wealth to be accredited but who are key
employees who want to help the company achieve success. Be-
cause of the 35 person limitation, some or all of these employ-
ees will be unable to participate as investors in that endeavor.
In fact, younger individuals are effectively foreclosed from
participating in private offerings. It frequently takes a number
of years until an individual is able to meet the $1 million
threshold, particularly if he or she has incurred substantial col-
lege or graduate school loans. At least in the current real es-
tate environment, home values are unlikely to bring increased
paper wealth in just a few years. No matter how well educated
or able to understand the risks and merits of even a modest
investment, the numerical limit severely limits the number of
persons able to participate in the offering. One might say, pa-
ternalistically, that such younger investors should invest their
savings in the public markets. To the contrary, the individual
contact between investor and issuer in a private offering
presents perhaps a better tradeoff. The purchaser of a traded
security must rely entirely on the public disclosures of the is-
suer. The purchaser of a security in a private placement is enti-
tled to ask for, and receive, from the company's officers infor-
there was a limit of 100 beneficial holders of the issuer's securities. 17 C.F.R.
§ 230.508 (2007).
129. Rule 501 (e) (1) of Regulation D excludes from the calculation of the
number of purchasers "[a]ny relative, spouse or relative of the spouse of a
purchaser who has the same principal residence as the purchaser." 17 C.F.R.
§ 230.501 (2007).
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mation that the investor deems important. Privity is created
with such disclosures, and the personal liability of company
officers who relate information provides a significant protec-
tion to the investor.
As with its other requirements, the SEC's numerical pro-
scription should be subjected to analysis in terms of investor
protection. In this light, the numerical limitation appears arbi-
trary and inconsistent with regulatory standards. Rules 505 and
506 both require that disclosure documents be provided to
non-accredited investors,130 that such purchasers be given the
opportunity to ask questions and receive answers, 3 1 that they
be apprised in writing of any material information given to ac-
credited investors not otherwise disclosed, 32 and that they be
advised specifically of resale limitations. 3 3 Given this full dis-
closure context, it is difficult to understand what investor pro-
tection goals are achieved by limiting the number of purchas-
ers. The SEC did not adopt numerical limitations for its Rule
147, Rule 504 and Regulation A exemptions, although neither
Rule 147 nor Rule 504 contain mandatory disclosure require-
ments. Yet, for Rules 505 and 506, which have substantial dis-
closure provisions, the SEC severely limits the number of non-
accredited purchasers.
Section 3(b) of the 1933 Act authorizes the SEC to issue
regulatory exemptions if registration is not necessary "by rea-
son of the small amount involved or the limited character of
the public offering."134 Even if this provision arguably justifies
a numerical limitation, the number 35 is extraordinarily low
and seems entirely inconsistent with the fact that there is no
numerical limitation on accredited investors. 135 Moreover,
under its expanded Section 28 authority to create registration
exemptions, there is no statutory reference to "small amounts"
130. The disclosure requirements vary depending on the amount of the
offering and whether the issuer is a 1934 Act reporting company. See 17
C.F.R. § 230.505-06 (2007).
131. 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(b)(2)(v) (2007).
132. 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(b) (2) (iv) (2007).
133. 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(b) (2) (vii) (2007).
134. Securities Act of 1933 § 3(b), 15 U.S.C. § 77c (2004).
135. Moreover, Section 3(b)'s language is not applicable to Rule 506,
which was adopted not under Section 3(b) authority but pursuant to the
Commission's general rule-making authority. 15 C.F.R. § 230.506 (2007).
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or the "limited character" of the offering.13 6 Despite the ex-
pansion of its authority, and the continual concerns expressed
by advocates of small business financing, the Commission's
Rules 505 and 506 persist in prohibiting small companies from
selling securities to more than 35 ordinary investors. It is time
that this prohibition is examined in light of realistic investor
protection goals.
C. Integration
The financial demands for smaller companies are often
sporadic and immediate.1 3 7 For many companies in develop-
ment stages, imetables cannot accurately forecast the need to
hire personnel, purchase additional equipment, invest in new
research, undertake marketing initiatives, modify existing or
potential products, or acquire other technologies. These
needs require immediate access to investment capital. Yet,
young companies usually do not have revenue or income
streams sufficient to finance an expanding business. Bank
loans are generally not available without substantial outside
collateral, and the capital resources of the founders and initial
investors are often entirely consumed through early stage de-
velopment. If pressing business needs are to be met, there may
be little choice but to seek funds from investors through equity
or debt sales. A registered offering is not feasible, for both
time and resource reasons, leaving only the option of raising
capital through an exempt offering. In addition to the signifi-
cant difficulties posed by the technical requirements of the va-
rious exemptions, we now add to the mix the doctrine of "inte-
gration," a doctrine of questionable justification that is entirely
inimical to the capital needs of small companies.
Integration as a securities law concept has been analo-
gized to the IRS step-transaction doctrine under which trans-
actions that appear to be separate in form are examined as to
substance to determine whether or not, in fact, they should be
136. Securities Act of 1933 § 28, 15 U.S.C. 77z-3 (2000). ("The Commis-
sion, by rule or regulation, may conditionally or unconditionally exempt any
person, security, or transaction, or any class or classes of persons, securities
or transactions, from any provision or provisions of this subchapter or of any
rule or regulation issued under this subchapter, to the extent that such ex-
emption is necessary or appropriate in the public interest, and is consistent
with the protection of investors.").
137. See discussion supra Part I.
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treated as distinct transactions.138 The integration doctrine is
entirely SEC-developed and is intended to assure that there
are clear delineations between the ending of one offering and
the start of another so that the relevant exemption conditions
can be applied. Thus, for example, suppose that an issuer un-
dertakes a Rule 505 offering and sells $3 million of securities
to 35 non-accredited investors to finance the construction of a
warehouse. One week following the sale to the 35th non-ac-
credited investor, the issuer announces a new issue of $3 mil-
lion of securities to be sold to another 35 non-accredited inves-
tors and the proceeds to be used to further the warehouse con-
struction under a purported new Rule 505 offering. These are
clearly evasive tactics to avoid both the numerical and mone-
tary limitations of Rule 505. In these circumstances, the issuer
cannot appropriately claim that the first Rule 505 offering en-
ded and that the second was a distinctly new Rule 505 offering.
To allow such run-on offerings would emasculate the Rule 505
conditions. The integration doctrine appropriately would treat
the two offerings as unified and thus the combined offerings
must fit within an exemption other than Rule 505 (which has
been exceeded) or be registered.
The integration doctrine initially arose in the context of
the intrastate offering exemption to explain the statutory "part
of an issue" language. 13 9 Inasmuch as the entire issue must be
offered and sold only to residents of a single state, how is the
"issue" defined? Would the "issue" include, for example, sales
to non-residents that occurred shortly before the start of the
intrastate offering? The SEC responded to these concerns by
creating a five-part test to determine when apparently distinct
offerings should be regarded as part of the same "issue," to
wit: 140
(1) Are the offerings part of a single plan of financing?
138. THOMAS LEE HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION § 4.12 (5th
ed. 2005).
139. Securities Act of 1933 § 3(a)(11), 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(11) (2000)
("Any security which is part of an issue offered and sold only to persons
resident within a single State. .. ").
140. The integration doctrine was initially formulated by the SEC to de-
fine the "part of an issue" language in the section 3(a) (11) intrastate exemp-
tion. 17 Fed. Reg. 11,896 (SEC Dec. 6, 1961). The doctrine set forth in this
Release has been extended to all exempt offerings through SEC rules and
interpretations.
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(2) Do the offerings involve the same class of security?
(3) Are the offerings made at or about the same time?
(4) Is the same type of consideration to be received?
(5) Are the offerings made for the same general purpose?
The existence of any one of these factors, according to
the SEC, may result in imposition of the integration doctrine.
As a practical matter, offerings relatively close in time will usu-
ally touch upon several of the listed factors. If integration is
deemed to exist between two or more offerings, the result will
usually be an unmitigated, non-curable disaster. If two pur-
portedly exempt offerings are integrated as a result of the SEC
doctrine, the two offerings will be considered as one, and that
one offering must meet all the conditions of a single registra-
tion exemption. It is difficult enough to meet exemption con-
ditions when planned. The chances of backing into an exemp-
tion for two offerings that are deemed to be integrated are
remote at best. The result will almost inevitably be the loss of
the exemption for both offerings, as it will be only the most
serendipitous of circumstances that would result in the amal-
gam of distinct offerings satisfying all the technical conditions
of a single exemption. 14'
In an effort to create certainty in place of the ambiguous
five-factor integration test, and provide some relief from the
strictures of the integration doctrine, the Commission created
a six-month safe harbor period for the Rule 147 and Regula-
tion D exemptions. Such exempt offerings will not be inte-
grated with offers that expired more than six months prior to
or do not start earlier than six months after the conclusion of
the exempt offering.1 42
141. Given the technical nature of every exemption, it would be a rarity
that such conditions could be satisfied in the unplanned setting of inte-
grated offerings. Suppose for example an issuer completes a $1 million Rule
504 offering and five months later sells securities to five investors in a Sec-
tion 4(2) private offering. If those offerings are integrated, the Rule 504
exemption will be lost by reason of exceeding the monetary limit, and the
Section 4(2) exemption will very likely also be lost by reason of the lack of
qualifications of the Rule 504 purchasers. No other exemption is likely to
come to the rescue.
142. Rule 147(b) (2), 17 C.F.R. § 230.147(b) (2) (2007); Regulation D, 17
C.F.R. 230.502(a) (2007). The SEC's August 2007 Release proposes to
shorten the integration safe harbor in Regulation D from six months to 90
days. See supra discussion in text at note 85. Special integration rules have
also been created for Regulation A offerings. 17 C.F.R. § 230.251(c) (2007).
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The integration doctrine is particularly harsh on smaller
companies for several reasons:
(1) The lack of definitive integration time frames for Sec-
tion 3(a) (11) and Section 4(2) offerings makes it very difficult
for small companies to utilize those exemptions if additional
financing is expected to be necessary in the near future.
(2) Although offerings within six months of one another
are not necessarily or even presumably integrated, the SEC
safe harbors create a strong implication favoring integration.
(3) The six-month safe harbors in Regulation D and Rule
147 are too long for smaller companies whose capital needs
are often sporadic and immediate. 143 The August 2007 SEC
proposal to shorten the integration safe harbor in Regulation
D from six months to 90 days offers some relief in this area,
but even the shortened 90-day period would be too long in our
judgment and fails to address the fundamental concerns
raised by the integration doctrine.1 4 4
(4) Younger companies need additional capital to finance
general growth and development. Although the specific eco-
nomic needs may be differentiated, e.g., among research and
marketing, the "single plan of financing" and "same general
purpose" factors in the integration test can readily be applied
to the foreseeable growth requirements of developing compa-
nies. It will therefore be very difficult for companies to avoid
the integration doctrine on grounds that the offerings are in
fact for distinct purposes.
One can readily find fault around the edges with the inte-
gration doctrine. A more fundamental problem arises when
one examines the doctrine from the perspective of investor
No safe harbor exists for statutory exemptions under Section 4(2) or Section
3(a) (11) of the 1933 Act. For such offerings there is no time frame that is
presumptively safe from the integration doctrine.
143. The reduction of the six-month time frame has been recommended
from time to time by participants at the SEC's Government-Small Business
Forum. The 2001 Final Report, for example, recommended that "The SEC
should reconsider the integration rules under Rule 502 to eliminate the pre-
sent safe harbor time requirements and apply the five-part test only to subse-
quent offerings when the prior offering has not clearly terminated." Final
Report of the SEC Government-Business Forum on Small Business Capital
Formation (Feb. 2002), available at http://www.sec.gov/info/smallbus/
gbfor20.htm (last visited Nov. 8, 2007).
144. See supra note 94 and accompanying discussion in text.
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protection concerns. It is appropriate to ask why an offering
that has fully satisfied those concerns as to one investor group
should be integrated with a distinct offering that has fully satis-
fied investor concerns for a second investor group? Let us sup-
pose a relatively simple integration problem. The company has
engaged in a successful intrastate offering, meeting all federal
and state exemption conditions. One week later the company
sells securities to several out-of-state residents in a Rule 506
offering. Both offerings raise capital for general development
purposes. Given the timing and purpose of the offerings, there
is little doubt that integration will be applied, with the result
that the unified, integrated offering will have no exemption
and, thus, the "combined" offering as so defined will be in vio-
lation of registration requirements. Yet, where in this scenario
has there been any deviation from investor protection inter-
ests? The purchasers in the intrastate offering have the locally-
based company to look to, the company continues to meet the
revenues, proceeds, and assets tests for intrastate offerings,
and any disclosure requirements imposed by state law will have
been satisfied. 145 Indeed, the subsequent private offering may
have strengthened the company's financial capacity much to
the benefit of the initial investors. Similarly, the Rule 506 pur-
chasers were accorded all the protections required by the SEC
in considering their investment decision. Indeed, their deci-
sion to invest may have been based in part on the company's
successful capitalization through the intrastate offering. What
basis exists, other than the integration doctrine itself, to re-
gard these two offerings as one and deny to the company the
ability to engage in such offerings?
The integration doctrine appears inconsistent with the
fact that the SEC has ostensibly crafted every registration ex-
emption in accordance with the perceived demands of inves-
tor protection. If a company meets those demands as to one
exempt offering, and also meets those demands in a subse-
quent exempt offering, however close in time or purpose, in-
145. A company planning to engage in multiple offerings over a relatively
short period of time risks a disclosure problem to the extent that later offer-
ings will affect capital structure, company operations, voting and control is-
sues. Disclosure of such factors may be important to investors in the initial
offerings.
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vestor protection concerns have been met in both offerings. 146
To apply the integration doctrine simply for the purpose of
integration itself has no justification. The justification has to
be investor protection, the foundation principle of the securi-
ties laws. Where distinct offerings have each fully complied
with the SEC requirements, application of an integration doc-
trine because the company "should have waited longer" is for-
malistic, serves no justifiable purpose, and is particularly puni-
tive to smaller companies.
D. Aggregation
The aggregation concept applies to exemptions that have
monetary ceilings, i.e. Rules 504 and 505, and Regulation A.147
Analogous to integration, the aggregation doctrine examines
multiple offerings and can result in the voidance of an other-
wise seemingly discrete and permissible exempt offering. Un-
like integration, aggregation looks only at the monetary factor,
and only examines prior sales of particular offerings during a
12-month period. 148 Aggregation can invalidate an offering
146. The SEC has a legitimate concern that its rules not be abused by
clever avoidance. That is why a company should not be allowed to create a
"new" Rule 505 offering, for example, each time it meets the numerical limit
of non-accredited investors. 17 C.F.R. § 230.505(b) (2) (ii) (2007). Although
investors apprised of this process may have no objections, and may be fully
protected in their interests, the company is simply trying to avoid one of the
principal exemption conditions. This clear evasion of a rule's conditions can
be easily recognized and prevented.
147. Rule 504(b) (2): "The aggregate offering price for an offering of se-
curities under this Rule 504... shall not exceed $1,000,000, less the aggre-
gate offering price for all securities sold within the twelve months before the
start of and during the offering of securities under this Rule 504, in reliance
on any exemption under section 3(b), or in violation of section 5(a) of the
Securities Act." 17 C.F.R. § 230.504(b)(2) (2007). An analogous provision
exists in Rule 505, except the limitation is $5 million. 17 C.F.R.
§ 230.505(b) (2) (i) (2007). Aggregation for Regulation A offerings also goes
back twelve months but applies only to securities sold under a Regulation A
offering. 17 C.F.R. § 230.251(b) (2007).
148. Aggregation for Rules 504 and 505 applies only to prior sales under
Section 3(b) exemptions or in violation of the 1933 Act. 17 C.F.R.
§ 230.504(b) (2) (2007); 17 C.F.R. § 230.505(b) (2) (i) (2007). Thus, a Rule
505 offering will be aggregated with Rule 504, Rule 505, and Regulation A
sales during the prior 12-month period, but the offering will not be aggre-
gated with prior private offering, intrastate, or Rule 506 sales. 17 C.F.R.
§ 230.505(b) (2) (i) (2007). Regulation A has a somewhat different aggrega-
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even where integration might not apply. For example, the sale
of $1,000,000 of securities under Rule 504 cannot be followed
eight months later by another Rule 504 offering, despite the
lack of integration. 149 The latter offering would be invalid, for
the $1 million aggregation maximum would have been met.
As with integration, it is fair to ask whether any investor
protection goals are achieved through the aggregation doc-
trine. Assuming that there are no disclosure issues as to poten-
tial dilution, voting, control, or other concerns as a result of
the multiple offerings, 150 it is difficult to find ajustification for
the aggregation doctrine other than the doctrine itself.151 And
once again an SEC provision falls most harshly on smaller
companies, which are the ones most likely to be raising capital
under one of the monetarily-limited exemptions.
The fraternal twins integration and aggregation are sound
doctrines that have been expanded beyond their fundamental
valid rationale. In our judgment, each should be cut back to
achieve its basic purpose, the avoidance of abusive offerings by
issuers clearly evasive of regulatory standards. The integration
doctrine should be pruned to clearly delineate the conclusion
of one offering from the beginning of another utilizing the
same exemption, but it should not apply to offerings that each
satisfy distinct exemption conditions. Similarly, aggregation
(assuming the concept is retained) should be applied to en-
sure that an exemption based on a monetary ceiling is not sub-
verted by artificial separation of one offering into two or more
tion provision which looks only to prior Regulation A sales within a 12-
month period. 17 C.F.R. § 230.251(b) (2007).
149. The six-month safe harbor of Rule 502(a) would preclude integra-
tion of these two offerings. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(a) (2007).
150. It is curious to note that disclosure concerns, if they existed, would
not be required to be disclosed to potential investors under Rule 504, which
has no disclosure conditions. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.504 (2007). Disclosure con-
cerns would also not be required to be disclosed to accredited investors
under Rule 505, to whom no disclosure obligations are owed. See 17 C.F.R.
§ 230.505 (2007). The lack of disclosure requirements in these circum-
stances belies the notion that the integration and aggregation doctrines
were based on disclosure concerns.
151. The Section 3(b) maximum of $5 million applies to "the aggregate
amount at which such issue is offered to the public." Securities Act of 1933
§ 3(b), 15 U.S.C. § 77c (2004). This is not equivalent to the SEC's aggrega-
tion doctrine that applies to sales made under distinct offerings even if not
integrated.
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tenuously distinct offerings. Each offering should stand on its
own merits. If an initial offering meets all exemption condi-
tions, a second offering meeting all exemption conditions
should not be integrated or be subject to aggregation except
in clear, evasive circumstances.
E. Potential Loss of Exemption Through Resales
Securities purchased pursuant to Section 4(2), Rule 506,
Rule 505, and in some circumstances Rule 504,152 are "re-
stricted securities" subject to resale limitations. 153 Resale limi-
tations are imposed in part to assure that a purchaser in an
exempt offering does not become a conduit to others who
would not be eligible purchasers under the exemption and in
part to avoid a secondary market beginning without adequate
public information. As a general rule, restricted securities can-
not be resold except pursuant to Rule 144, the safe harbor
adopted by the SEC to determine when restricted securities,
and securities owned by control persons, may be safely re-
sold. 154 The minimum holding period of restricted securities
under Rule 144 is one year.155 If any resales of "restricted se-
curities" occur within the one-year period, or otherwise not in
152. Securities acquired in a Rule 504 offering are restricted pursuant to
Rule 502(d) unless the offering was state registered or made under a state's
accredited investor exemption. 17 C.F.R. § 230.504(b) (2007).
153. Regulation D, 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(d) (2007) (stating ". . . securities
acquired in a transaction under Regulation D shall have the status of securi-
ties acquired in a transaction under Section 4(2) of the Act and cannot be
resold without registration under the Act or an exemption therefrom.").
The term "restricted securities" is applied to such securities in Rule 144. 17
C.F.R. § 230.144(a) (3) (ii) (2007).
154. Rule 144, 17 C.F.R. § 230.144 (2007). Rule 144 is not exclusive,
meaning that there may be a resale not meeting Rule 144 conditions that
could also not constitute an underwriting. However, Rule 144 is the domi-
nant set of conditions and any resales not in accordance with Rule 144 are
fraught with the "underwriter" risk.
155. Rule 144(d)(1), 17 C.F.R. § 230.144(d)(1) (2007) ("A minimum of
one year must elapse between the.., date of the acquisition of the securities
from the issuer ... and any resale of such securities in reliance on this sec-
tion .. "). In December, 2007, the SEC shortened the holding period to six
months for securities of 1934 Act reporting companies. Revisions to Rule
144 and 145, Securities Act Release No. 33-8869, 2007 WL 4441239 (Dec. 17,
2007). Most small companies selling securities under registration exemp-
tions are not 1934 Act reporting companies and the minimum one-year
holding period remains applicable.
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accordance with all of the Rule 144 provisions, there is a sub-
stantial danger that the seller would be regarded as an "under-
writer," that is, as one who is engaged in a distribution on be-
half of the issuer. Not only would the seller be at risk, but
there is also a likelihood that the issuer's distribution of securi-
ties under its exemption would be regarded as continuing, and
the resale would be judged against the standards of the initial
exemption. This puts the issuer at enormous risk of losing its
exemption ex post facto, as subsequent resales might cause the
total number of purchasers to exceed the numerical limits,
might be to persons who are not eligible under the exemption
conditions, or might be made without the disclosure man-
dated by the particular exemption under which the issuer sold
the securities.
Complicating the resale problem even further is the fact
that privately-held companies often cannot take advantage of
the resale safe harbor provided by Rule 144. Rule 144 provides
that as a condition for resale there be available at the time of
resale "adequate public information" with respect to the issuer
of the securities.156 For publicly-held companies, this condi-
tion is met by compliance with the quarterly and annual re-
porting provisions of the 1934 Securities Exchange Act. For
smaller companies that have not engaged in a registered offer-
ing and whose securities are not registered under the 1934 Se-
curities Exchange Act, the public information requirement
will be met only if certain specified information is provided to
broker-dealers who offer quotations in securities. 157 Most small
businesses have no secondary market for their securities and
there are no broker-dealer quotations. The result is that, with
few exceptions, small, privately-held issuers have no safe har-
bor to counter the potentially fatal effect of one or more re-
sales of securities issued in an otherwise exempt transaction.15 8
156. Rule 144(c), 17 C.F.R. § 230.144(c) (2007).
157. 17 C.F.R. § 230.144(c) (2) (2007) ("If the issuer is not subject to sec-
tion 13 or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, there is publicly
available the information concerning the issuer specified in paragraphs
(a)(5)(i) to (xiv), inclusive, and paragraph (a)(5)(xvi) of Rule 15c2-11
under that Act .... ).
158. Insurance companies may qualify for the safe harbor by providing
the information specified in Section 12(g)(2)(G)(i) of the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934. Banking corporations and other regulated depository
institutions are required to file monthly operational and financial reports
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Journal of Law and Business
HeinOnline  -- 4 N.Y.U. J. L. & Bus. 55 2007-2008
NYU JOURNAL OF LAW AND BUSINESS
Shares obtained in an intrastate offering under Section
3 (a) (11) or Rule 147 are not "restricted" in the technical sense
of Rule 144, but resale limitations apply. In particular, if pur-
chasers sell their shares to non-residents, such resales may
cause the issuer to lose the intrastate exemption. The princi-
pal question is whether the securities have "come to rest"
within the issuer's state prior to any out-of-state resales. 159 In
an effort to drive home to purchasers the importance of not
making such resales, issuers will often obtain from purchasers
letters of investment intent denying any plan or intention to
resell the securities. These letters are of limited evidentiary
value compared to the time frame that elapses between the
purchase and resale. The time frame controls the "coming to
rest" doctrine, yet for Section 3(a) (11) transactions there is no
statutory or regulatory safe harbor or other provision deter-
mining time frame parameters. The burden of proof is on the
issuer to show that all exemption conditions have been satis-
fied, including the burden to show that the securities came to
rest within the state prior to any resales.1 60 Given the lack of
any firm standards, the issuer's burden of proof may be diffi-
cult to sustain if out-of-state resales occur, despite the issuer's
best efforts to prevent them, within a few months after the
close of the issuer's offering. Although Rule 147 eliminated
with the federal bank regulatory agencies. This information is publicly avail-
able and sometimes is relied upon by attorneys giving opinions in connec-
tion with transfers of restricted securities of such financial institutions.
159. Securities Act Release No. 4,386, 1961 WL 61608 (July 12, 1961)
("the quick commencement of trading and prompt resale of portions of the
issue to non-residents raises a serious question whether all of the issue has, in
fact, come to rest in the hands of the investors resident in the state of the
initial offering.").
160. In Busch v. Carpenter, 827 F.2d 653 (10th Cir. 1987), involving re-
sales to non-residents seven months after a Section 3(a) (11) offering, the
court held that the issuer had made out a prima facie case of compliance
with Section 3(a) (11) because all initial purchasers were in-state residents,
and that the burden of proof then shifted to plaintiffs to show that the secur-
ities had not come to rest within the state, a burden that plaintiffs failed to
meet. This holding was contrary to the SEC's amicus brief and with the obli-
gation of the issuer, as enunciated in SEC v. Ralston Purina, note 46, supra, to
prove all elements of an exemption, including the "coming to rest" require-
ment. The court's willingness to regard a seven-month time frame as suffi-
cient for Section 3(a) (11) purposes may be of comfort to those looking for
standards, but the court's approach to the burden of proof issue renders the
decision suspect as to precedential value.
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the uncertain time frame by adopting a nine-month period
from the date of issuer's last sale, 61 the fundamental problem
remains that an issuer that otherwise meets all of the intrastate
exemption conditions could lose the exemption by reason of a
purchaser's all-too-soon out-of-state gift or resale of the securi-
ties. 162
The SEC is well aware of the resale problem posed to issu-
ers and has provided in Regulation D, and in Rule 147, a list of
measures that an issuer can take to attempt to protect itself.
These measures include restrictive legends on certificates, stop
transfer instructions to transfer agents or company registrars,
and written disclosure of resale limitations. 163 However, con-
formity to the SEC guidelines does not immunize the issuer
from resale problems. Although the precautionary measures
to be taken by issuers are mandatory in Rule 147, there is no
provision protecting issuers that adopt such measures. Simi-
larly, the measures set forth in Regulation D are simply exam-
ples of "reasonable care" that an issuer should take to assure
that purchasers do not become underwriters. 16 4 There is no
provision protecting issuers that have taken such measures but
find that resales have been made despite their efforts.
Resale limitations are appropriate to assure the integrity
of an exemption where numerical, disclosure, or purchaser
qualification conditions exist. Although resale limitations can
chill a potential investor's desire to purchase securities, or re-
161. 17 C.F.R. § 230.147(e) (2007). The nine month period does not be-
gin to run until the issuer's final sale under Rule 147, and thus for any par-
ticular purchaser the time frame can be quite a bit longer and, without pre-
cise knowledge of issuer's activities, quite uncertain. The uncertainty could
readily lead to good faith yet mistaken beliefs that the nine month period
has expired.
162. See, e.g., Williamsburg Apartments, SEC No-Action Letter, 1974 WL
10014 (Jan. 10, 1974) (SEC staff refused to give no-action letter regarding a
proposed gift of small number of shares to non-resident).
163. Compare 17 C.F.R. § 230.147(0 (2007), with 17 C.F.R. §230.502(d)
(2007). The list of measures are not identical. Rule 502(d) makes no refer-
ence to stop transfer instructions but includes a "reasonable inquiry" that
the purchaser is acquiring the securities for himself or another person.
164. 17 C.F.R. § 240.502(d) (2007). Rule 502(d), 17 CFR 240.502(d)
(2007) ("The issuer shall exercise reasonable care to assure that the purchas-
ers of the securities are not underwriters within the meaning of section
2 (11) of the Act, which reasonable care may be demonstrated by the follow-
ing .... ").
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suit in undervaluation of the offered security, the limitations
are an appropriate safeguard against abuse of the exemption
conditions. However, where the issuer has taken reasonable
steps in good faith to prevent improper resales, the exemption
from registration should not be lost by reason of unforesee-
able, improper transactions beyond the issuer's control.
Whatever damage a resale causes to the integrity of the initial
exemption is not sufficient, in our judgment, to impose upon
a good faith issuer the risk of an offering violation. 165
F. Lack of Coordination with State Law
No federal exemption from registration other than Rule
506 exempts the issuer from state registration requirements. 166
The substantial problems caused by the lack of federal-state
uniformity, and the disparate laws at state levels, were noted by
Congress over 25 years ago when it added Section 19(c) to the
1933 Securities Act, authorizing the Commission to cooperate
with state securities administrators "in effectuating greater uni-
formity in Federal-State securities matters."1 67 Among the
cited purposes for such uniformity was "minimum interfer-
ence with business of capital formation."' 168
Spurred by Congressional mandate, the SEC and the
North American Securities Administrators Association
(NASAA) sat down to create a state exemption that would be
coordinated with at least one major federal exemption. The
result was the Uniform Limited Offering Exemption
("ULOE") adopted by NASAA in 1983 and subsequently
165. The statute of limitations for violation of the registration require-
ment is one year. Securities Act of 1933, § 13, 15 U.S.C. 77m (2005). If a
violation occurs within that period and, as a result, the issuer loses its
claimed exemption, the draconian result is that the entire offering is subject
to rescission rights by purchasers along with interest. Securities Act of 1933
§ 12(a)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 771 (a) (1) (2005).
166. Rule 506 offerings come under the concept of "covered securities"
that are exempt from state registration requirements. National Securities
Marketing Improvement Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-290, 110 Stat. 3416
(1996).
167. The provision has since been moved to subsection 19(d) (1). Securi-
ties Act of 1933 § 19(d)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 77s(d)(1) (2005).
168. The provision has since been moved to subsection 19(d) (2) (C). Se-
curities Act of 1933 § 19(d) (2) (C), 15 U.S.C. § 77s(d) (2) (C) (2005).
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adopted by most states. 16 9 ULOE was modeled after the then-
recently adopted Rule 505 of Regulation D. However, ULOE
contains significant requirements beyond those found in Reg-
ulation D. Foremost among the additional limitations are suit-
ability standards that prohibit sales to non-accredited investors
unless the issuer has reasonable grounds to believe that the
investment is suitable based on the investor's financial situa-
tion and needs or that the purchaser, either alone or with a
purchaser's representative, has knowledge and experience to
evaluate the investment's merits and risks. These requirements
go far beyond Rule 505, which has no financial or sophistica-
tion requirements applicable to non-accredited investors. 170 If
the Congressional purpose in mandating a cooperative effort
was to create uniformity between federal and state exemp-
tions, ULOE did not meet that purpose.
A more profound problem with ULOE is that its basis is
Rule 505, an exemption laden with the Regulation D prohibi-
tions against general solicitation and advertising, an impracti-
cal ceiling on the number of non-accredited purchasers, a
monetary ceiling that in today's economy is unrealistically low,
and the twin doctrines of integration and aggregation. Rule
505 is one of the least useful federal exemptions, and ULOE
burdens companies even more with additional conditions that
limit a company's efforts to market its securities. In short,
ULOE fails to achieve the Congressional purpose of "mini-
mum interference" with capital formation.
The goal of coordinated federal-state registration exemp-
tions will not be achieved as long as states continue to apply
registration and exemption provisions without regard to fed-
eral exemptions. Although some states have adopted exemp-
tions that tie into the federal scheme, these instances are the
169. ULOE has been adopted in approximately 40 states. Some states that
have not adopted ULOE nevertheless have state exemptions that fairly anal-
ogous to the Rule 505 conditions, such as numerical limits, no general adver-
tising or solicitation, and disclosure requirements.
170. The current ULOE form may be found in NASAA Reports (CCH).
Other ULOE conditions not found in Rule 505 are a limitation on payment
of commissions only to state-licensed dealers and state-oriented worthy issuer
provisions.
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exception. 171 The principal state exemption other than ULOE
in most states is one based on a very limited number of pur-
chasers in a 12-month period and the absence of general ad-
vertising and solicitation. 172 Even if a company is able to wend
its way through the technicalities of a federal exemption, state
laws will often impede an effective marketing effort. 173
We do not advocate elimination or complete preemption
of state securities laws. State registration and exemption provi-
sions should continue to be applied to intrastate offerings
under Section 3(a) (11) or Rule 147, as those exemptions are
based on the ability of states to regulate such local offerings.
State enforcement of antifraud provisions is also an important
tool for investor protection and no federal preemption should
apply to state enforcement measures. However, beyond these
parameters, we believe that serious consideration should be
given to a broader preemption approach to clear the cluttered
decks of overlapping and inconsistent federal-state registration
exemptions.
Federal legislation providing for preemption of state re-
gistration laws beyond the current status is likely to be met
with substantial state opposition. 174 State administrators are
171. For example, New Jersey, Colorado, and Oklahoma are among a
handful of states that treat a Regulation A offering as exempt from state
registration.
172. UNIF. SEC. Ac'r § 402(b) (9) (1956) (transaction directed to not more
than 10 persons in the state in a 12-month period if seller reasonably be-
lieves that all buyers are purchasing for investment and no commissions paid
to any person); § 402(11) (no more than 25 purchasers in state in 12-month
period, no general solicitation or general advertising, no commission other
than to licensed broker-dealer unless exemption, and either (i) seller rea-
sonably believes all purchasers are purchasing for investment or (ii) immedi-
ately after sales, securities of issuer held by 50 or fewer persons and aggre-
gate offering does not exceed $500,000). Many states have adopted either
the 1956 or 1985 versions of the Uniform Securities Act, with substantial
variations being made to its provisions including transactions exempt from
registration.
173. An additional problem with ULOE is the lack of uniform adoption
among states. ULOE has not been adopted by every state. A number of states
that have adopted ULOE have modified or added to its requirements. The
result is a continuing hodgepodge of state exemptions, causing small compa-
nies and their counsel to continue to have to examine and react to differing
state laws.
174. In January, 2008, the North American Securities Administrators Asso-
ciation announced its legislative priorities for 2008, chief among them being
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wary about ceding any autonomy over securities offerings, for
securities frauds that occur from time to time have enormous
local impact and inevitably lead to fingers pointed at state reg-
ulatory agencies. Washington is distant and faceless. State ad-
ministrators often bear the brunt of criticism when defrauded
investors discover their losses. State administrators are likely to
view with alarm efforts to increase the opportunities for unre-
gistered offerings and the preemption of state registration and
exemption requirements. Nevertheless, the status quo is
equally inimical to the universally acknowledged desire to fa-
cilitate capital raising opportunities for legitimate small busi-
nesses. Rather than simply declare an irresolvable impasse,
new efforts should be undertaken to consider a carefully con-
structed coordinated exemption scheme that fosters the goals
of capital growth and investor protection. Federal preemption
may be a necessary element but it must be examined consis-
tent with state concerns for the welfare of its citizens.
G. Unregistered Brokers and Exempt Offerings
Under the Blue Sky laws of many states, payment of com-
missions or other compensation to securities intermediaries is
limited to persons who are registered in those states.175 There-
fore, sales payments to an unregistered person could jeopard-
ize the issuer's exemption from registration. A "broker" is a
person "engaged in the business of effecting transactions in
securities for the account of others."1 76 Smaller transactions
are not generally attractive to most securities broker-dealers
for economic and potential liability reasons. Nevertheless,
there are literally thousands of "finders" and other persons
willing to match private investors and smaller companies for a
fee, typically contingent on a percentage of the funds contrib-
uted. Most of these persons are not registered as broker-deal-
ers with the Financial Institutions National Regulatory Author-
preserving the authority of state regulators and evaluating the "negative ef-
fects" of preempting state laws. State Securities Regulators Want Congress to En-
sure Their Authority, 40 Sec. Reg. L. Rep. (BNA) 161 (Feb. 5, 2008).
175. UNIF. LTD. OFFERING EXEMPTION 6201: "No commission, fee or
other remuneration shall be paid or given, directly or indirectly, to any per-
son for soliciting any prospective purchasers in this state unless such person
is appropriately registered in this state."
176. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 3(a) (4) (A), 15 U.S.C. § 78c
(2000).
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ity (FINRA), formerly the National Association of Securities
Dealers (NASD) or the states in which they operate. Through
mutual ignorance or otherwise, payment of fees to an unregis-
tered finder can eliminate the availability of an exemption
from registration.
The idea of limited registration of persons whose sole ac-
tivity as a broker is in connection with private capital raising,
merger and similar transactions has been endorsed in many
quarters. It was the top recommendation of the SEC Govern-
ment-Business Forum on Small Business Capital Formation in
2004 and 2005177 and the topic of a special workshop at the
2006 Forum. A primary recommendation of the United States
Securities and Exchange Commission Advisory Committee on
Smaller Public Companies in April 2006 was that the SEC
spearhead a multi-agency effort to create a streamlined regis-
tration process for finders, mergers and acquisitions advisors
and institutional private placement brokers ("PPBs").178 The
recommendation recognized that a critical impediment to
small business capital formation could be eliminated without
loss of investor protection. A large number of PPBs currently
operate in a massive "gray market." The goal is to bring them
into the mainstream by imposing only rational, necessary regu-
lation on their activities. Investors will then be able to be able
to access information about them, and the anti-fraud rules of
the SEC and state regulatory agencies will be fully applicable
to their activities. 179
177. Final Report of the 24th Annual SEC Government-Business Forum
on Small Business Capital Formation, Securities Regulation Recommenda-
tion #17, available at http://www.sec.gov/info/smallbus/gbfor24.pdf (last
visited Nov. 4, 2007); Final Report of the 23rd Annual SEC Government-
Business Forum on Small Business Capital Formation, Securities Regulation
Recommendation #5, available at http://www.sec.gov/info/smalibus/gbfor
23.pdf (last visited Nov. 4, 2007).
178. Final Report of the Advisory Committee on Smaller Public Compa-
nies to the United States Securities and Exchange Commission, Recommen-
dation IV.P.6, available at www.sec.gov/info/smallbus/acspc/acspc-finalre-
port.pdf (last visited Nov. 4, 2007).
179. The most comprehensive analysis of private transaction in-
termediaries is contained in the 2005 Report and Recommendation of the Task
Force on Private Placement Broker-Dealers (the "Report"). The Task Force on
Private Placement Broker-Dealers, Report and Recommendation of the Task Force
on Private Placement Broker-Dealers 60 Bus. LAW. 959 (May 2005). The Report
was the culmination of more than eight years of work by the Private Place-
ment Broker-Dealer Task Force, a group of lawyers drawn from interested
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The SEC is the logical agency to spearhead a rational reg-
ulatory reform to legitimize PPBs. FINRA is unlikely on its own
initiative to take the lead role in implementing a registration
procedure for PPBs. l80 While several states are evaluating pos-
sible legislative and regulatory initiatives addressing some of
the issues included in the Report, state action may take years
to implement and would be less efficient and less effective
than if the SEC takes action to coordinate the effort and en-
courage consistency. In fact, although states such as California,
Michigan, Minnesota, Iowa, South Dakota and Texas have
adopted or proposed regulations regarding finders, the provi-
sions are not uniform and, therefore, of only limited utility.
More significantly, no state regulation, however liberal, can
operate on a national basis or even beyond its borders without
complementary federal relief. By taking the leadership role,
we believe the SEC can explore with the FINRA and the states
not only the limited registration and ongoing regulatory pro-
cess recommended in the Report but also alternative regimes
to accomplish the same goals. For example, an exemption
from federal broker-dealer registration might be appropriate
if there is registration in at least one state, by analogy to the
structure utilized for offerings under Rule 504 of Regulation
D. Other models, such as the federal-state division of responsi-
bility for investment advisors, might similarly accommodate
the needs of the SEC, the FINRA, and the states.
IV.
PART IV: MEANWI nLE, BACK AT THE RANCH: THE SEC's
ENIGMATIC SILENCE
The barriers to capital-raising imposed on small compa-
nies are not unknown to the SEC. On the contrary, there has
been a steady drumbeat of criticism and proposed reform
measures. The mystery is why the SEC has been so reticent to
committees of the Business Law Section of the American Bar Association.
The thrust of the Report's recommendations is to provide a simplified regis-
tration process and on-going regulatory oversight better adapted to the lim-
ited nature of the business of PPBs.
180. The FINRA's organization and member fee structure reflects the tre-
mendous amount of infrastructure necessary for it properly to carry out its
regulatory duties. While we believe that the limited class of PPBs easily can
be fit within the self-regulatory framework, to conclude that the FINRA will
do so voluntarily without direction from the Commission is, we think, naive.
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respond. Until August 2007, it had been 25 years since the last
major SEC development of registration exemptions, 181 and
the August 2007 proposals can scarcely be called major revi-
sions.
Despite the SEC profession of interest in small business,
there has been a great deal more smoke than fire. A poignant
example of this duality is the Concept Release issued in
1996,182 in which the Commission sought input on a wide
range of registration and disclosure issues, including the fol-
lowing:
Comment also is requested with regard to a broader
relaxation of general solicitation prohibitions on of-
ferings made under Regulation D Rules 505 and 506.
Is the inability to reach out broadly to find qualified
investors for such Regulation D offerings unnecessa-
rily hampering the utility of the Regulation and rais-
ing costs to issuers?
Did the Commission need to ask this question? More im-
portantly, did it listen to the answers? Every year for 10 years
following the SEC request for comments, Reports from the an-
nual SEC Government-Business Forum on Small Business Cap-
ital Formation 183 contained an unequivocal recommendation
that the general solicitation prohibitions be eliminated or sub-
stantially modified.18 4 For example, the 1996 Report, issued
soon after the SEC's call for comments, stated that "[t]he
Commission should eliminate the general solicitation require-
ment for all Regulation D offerings." 185 Over ten years of con-
stant recommendations from small business representatives
181. Regulation D was adopted in 1982. Securities Act Release No. 6,389,
1982 WL 35662 (Mar. 8, 1982); Revision of Certain Exemptions from Regis-
tration for Transactions Involving Limited Offers and Sales, 17 C.F.R.
§ 230.501-506 (1982).
182. Effect of the 1933 Act Concepts on Capital Formation, Securities Act
Release No. 7,314, Exchange Act Release No. 37,480, [1996-1997 Transfer
Binder], Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 85, 823, at 88,291 (July 25, 1996).
183. The annual meeting is mandated by the Omnibus Small Business
Capital Formation Act of 1980. See supra note 1, discussing 15 U.S.C. § 80c-1.
184. Annual Reports from the Forums are available on the SEC's website
at http://www.sec.gov/info/smallbus/sbforumreps.htm.
185. Final Report of the SEC Government-Business Forum on Small Busi-
ness Capital Formation, http://www.sec.gov/info/smallbus/finrepI5.htm
(last visited Nov. 4 2007).
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should have been sufficient answer to the Commission's 1996
inquiry. The SEC duly prepared and published the annual re-
ports containing these and other recommendations186 and un-
til August 2007 that was the end of the road.187
The Commission's deaf ear to Annual Forum recommen-
dations seemed to be turned as well towards its own Advisory
Committee on Smaller Public Companies.1 88 The Committee
was formed in 2004 principally to examine the impact of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act on smaller public companies, but the
Committee's charter included examination of "offering ex-
emptions" for small businesses. 189 Among the numerous find-
ings and recommendations contained in the Committee's Fi-
nal Report was Recommendation IV.P.5, calling for the adop-
tion of a new private offering exemption "that does not
prohibit general solicitation and advertising for transactions
with purchasers who do not need all the protections of the
Securities Act's registration requirements."'' 90 Echoing years
of critique, the Committee Report pointed out the lack of
bright-line tests, the difficulties in making judgments regard-
ing the general solicitation standards, and the need to mod-
186. In addition to the recommendations regarding general advertising
and solicitation, among the most frequent recommendations are the raising
of the monetary limits on Rule 504 and Regulation A offerings, reducing the
six-month integration guidelines, and seeking further federal preemption of
state law for federally exempt offerings.
187. The 1996 Concept Release apparently led to the 1998 Release on
Regulation of Securities Offerings. Securities Act Release No. 7,606A (Nov.
13, 1998). The so-called Aircraft Carrier release (so-called because of the size
of the release) contained numerous proposals, none of which related to the
general advertising and solicitation limitations imposed on small businesses
or any other exemption provisions.
188. Advisory Committee on Smaller Public Companies, Securities Act Re-
lease No. 8,514, Exchange Act Release No. 50,864, 84 SEC Docket (CCH)
1340, at 1340 (Dec. 16, 2004) ("The Chairman of the Securities and Ex-
change Commission ("Commission"), with the concurrence of the other
Commissioners, intends to establish the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion Advisory Committee on Smaller Public Companies to assist the Commis-
sion in evaluating the current securities regulatory system relating to disclo-
sure, financial reporting, internal controls, and offering exemptions for smaller
public companies. ) (emphasis added).
189. Id.
190. Final Report of the Advisory Committee on Smaller Public Compa-
nies to the United Sstates Securities and Exchange Commission at 74 (Apr.
23, 2006), available at http://www.sec.gov/info/smallbus/acspc/acspc-final
report.pdf.
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Journal of Law and Business
HeinOnline  -- 4 N.Y.U. J. L. & Bus. 65 2007-2008
NYU JOURNAL OF LAW AND BUSINESS
ernize rules to take advantage of new communication technol-
ogies.' 91
It took the Commission more than a year to respond to
the Advisory Committee's endorsement of the recommenda-
tions that had been made repeatedly by annual SEC-Small Bus-
iness Forums. Although the August 2007 Release, including
proposed Rule 507, purports to address the recommendations
of the Advisory Committee, the proposals are very limited in
scope and fail to remedy the concern expressed by the Advi-
sory Committee that the current ban on general solicitation
and advertising "is a significant impediment to the efficient
formation of capital for smaller companies. ''192
We may be encouraged that the Commission is at last fo-
cusing attention on small business financing, but the wonder is
that it took the Commission so long. Over the past decade,
scores of new and revised rules have been proposed, debated,
and issued by the SEC in numerous areas involving a vast array
of regulation. 193 No doubt every rule change has been
prompted by an important concern. But one finds it difficult
to understand from a policy standpoint why the Commission
has spent countless hours and energy on numerous matters of
large and small import, while scant attention has been given to
the pressing capital formation problems of small businesses.
While small business concerns languished, the SEC conscien-
tiously studied and responded to various technical issues appli-
cable to mega-companies and other larger publicly-held busi-
nesses. The mammoth Securities Offering Reform Release is-
191. "Beyond the difficulty of determining if particular contact is imper-
missible, however, the current ban on general solicitation and advertising
effectively prohibits issuers from taking advantage of the tremendous effi-
ciencies and reach of the Internet to communicate with potential investors
who do not need all the protections of the Securities Act's registration re-
quirements. In our view, this is a significant impediment to the efficient formation
of capital for smaller companies, one that could easily be corrected by modernizing
the existing prohibitions on advertising and general solicitation." Id. at 75.
(emphasis added).
192. Id.
193. For example, in recent years there have been 22 releases regarding
EDGAR filings, 14 delegations of authority to the staff divisions by the Com-
mission, and a dozen (and continuing) rules, revisions and releases regard-
ing Sarbanes-Oxley certifications and reports. See SEC Final Rules, available
at http://www.sec.gov/rules/final.shtml (last visited Nov. 3, 2007).
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sued in 2005194 contained numerous provisions easing
communication rules for publicly-held companies, including
such matters as forward-looking information, free-writing pro-
spectuses, road shows, web sites, media publications, and re-
search reports. The larger the company, the less the condi-
tions.195 The Release was well constructed, carefully crafted,
and obviously the result of long hours of research and analysis
by SEC staff members. However laudable the results, one
might be excused for thinking that the Release was another
instance of "the rich got richer," with little benefit to compa-
nies not in the public markets. 196 It remains to be seen
whether the Commission's August 2007 Release marks the be-
ginning of a more comprehensive examination of small busi-
ness concerns.
A. Seeking Justification for the Commission's Inaction
In the absence of any SEC studies or findings justifying
the continuing restraints on small business financing, one can
only speculate as to the reasons for the Commission's less-
than-benign neglect. The following possible explanations
come to mind:
194. See Securities Offering Reform, Securities Act Release No. 8,591, Ex-
change Act Release No 52,056, 2005 WL 1692642 (Aug. 3, 2005).
195. The Release divided companies into four categories: well-known sea-
soned issuers (WKSI), seasoned issuers, unseasoned issuers, and non-report-
ing issuers. Rule provisions varied depending on the category of issuer. Id. at
2881-88.
196. The genesis for much of the changes contained in the Release was
the equally massive so-called "Aircraft Carrier" set of proposals issued by the
Commission in 1998. See Securities Act Release No. 7,606A (Nov. 13, 1998).
The 2005 Release contained two provisions that could be helpful to first-time
issuers in an IPO. One provision allows such issuers to use "free writing pro-
spectuses" after the filing of a registration statement, pursuant to newly cre-
ated Rules 164 and 433. 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.164, 433 (2007). A second provi-
sion creates a safe harbor against "gun-jumping" concerns for communica-
tions by issuers more than 30 days prior to filing a registration statement, as
long as there is no reference to a securities offering. 17 C.F.R. § 230.163A
(2007).
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1. The Commission May Believe that Current Regulations are
Adequate to Address the Capital Formation Problems of
Small Businesses
Does the Commission regard the current set of registra-
tion exemptions sufficient for small business financing? This
scenario seems unlikely. It is clear, for example, that Section
3(b)'s $5 million ceiling established over 25 years ago is woe-
fully inadequate in today's economy, to say nothing of the $1
million ceiling imposed on Rule 504. Did the Commission re-
ceive no message from Congress' adoption in 1996 of Section
28 to the 1933 Act authorizing the Commission to create regis-
tration exemptions without monetary limits?19 7 It must also be
plain to the Commission that its attempt in Regulation A to
ameliorate timing and cost problems through a "test the wa-
ters" concept has been thwarted by the refusal of most states to
allow pre-filing solicitation without state registration. Moreo-
ver, the Commission cannot be impervious to the constant
stream of recommendations from the Small Business Forum to
eliminate or modify the prohibitions against general advertis-
ing and solicitation or the recent conclusion of its own Advi-
sory Committee on Smaller Public Companies that the current
anti-solicitation rules were "a significant impediment to the
formation of capital for smaller companies."1 9 8
In 1978, the Commission initiated public hearings to dis-
cuss small business financing, noting in the call for study that
"Some have contended further that the net effect of these
[SEC] policies is to endanger the continued existence of
smaller companies and to inhibit the formation of new enter-
prises." 199
197. "The Commission, by rule or regulation, may conditionally or uncon-
ditionally exempt any person, security or transaction, or any class or classes
of persons, securities, or transactions, from any provision or provisions of
this title or of any rule or regulation issued under this title, to the extent that
such exemption is necessary or appropriate in the public interest, and is
consistent with the protection of investors." Securities Act of 1933 § 28, 15
U.S.C. § 77 z-3 (2004).
198. See supra note 190, at 75.
199. Examination of the Effects of Rules and Regulations on the Ability of
Small Business to Raise Capital and the Impact on Small Business of Disclo-
sure Requirements Under the Securities Act, Securities Act Release No.
5,914, Exchange Act Release No. 14,529, 14 SEC Docket 314, at 316 (Mar. 6,
1978).
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The 1978 Study led to the adoption of Regulation D in
1982. Although Regulation D replaced and modified prior ex-
isting exemptions under Rules 146, 240 and 242,200 the revised
exemptions did not significantly reduce the compliance
problems for small businesses. Nevertheless, the SEC soon
found reason to congratulate itself for ajob well done. An SEC
Study of Regulation D, issued in 1984 two years after the Regu-
lation's promulgation, 20' examined the 7,222 Regulation D fil-
ings that had been made from April 1982 through 1983, total-
ing $15.5 billion of intended sales. The Study found the sales
figures to be "impressive, and much of the credit for the large
amount of intended sales must be given to the simplification
of the exemptive offering process."20 2
Let's examine the "impressive" Regulation D filing
figures. The figures indicate 4,130 filings on an annualized ba-
sis.203 In 1984, there were a reported 4,815,000 non-farm com-
panies other than sole proprietorships. 20 4 The Regulation D
filings therefore represented less than 1/10th of 1% of all non-
farm enterprises. How did the other 99.9% of all companies
raise capital? Perhaps some used unreported exemptions, such
as Section 4(2) and the intrastate offering exemptions. Those
numbers cannot be too significant. For many smaller compa-
nies, Regulation D's Rule 506 has material advantages over
Section 4(2), such as its focus on purchasers rather than offer-
ees, its acceptance of purchaser representatives, and its elimi-
"The Commission, by rule or regulation, may conditionally or uncondition-
ally exempt any person, security or transaction, or any class or classes of
persons, securities, or transactions, from any provision or provisions of this
title or of any rule or regulation issued under this title, to the extent that
such exemption is necessary or appropriate in the public interest, and is
consistent with the protection of investors." Securities Act of 1933 § 28, 15
U.S.C. § 77z-3 (2004).
200. See supra notes 80-81 and accompanying text.
201. An Analysis of Regulation D [1984 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 83,631 (May, 1984).
202. Id.
203. The 1983-4 figures are offered for purposes of analysis only and can
be deemed only illustrative since the Commission no longer issues figures
regarding total number of annual Regulation D filings.
204. 2007 Table 724, Number of Returns, Receipts, and Net Income by
Type of Business: 1980 to 2003, U.S. Census Bureau, the 2007 Statistical Ab-
stract: the National data Book, Statistical Abstract of the U.S. 487, available at
http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/tables/07so724.xisprod/2006
pubs/07statab/business.pdf
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nation of disclosure requirement to accredited investors. Small
companies are, therefore, much more likely to avail them-
selves of Rule 506, which would be included in the reported
1983-4 figures. Intrastate offerings are not federally reported,
but they will often be subject to state registration if they do not
meet the rather narrow state exemptions. State registration
figures for companies utilizing federal exemptions have never
been large, principally because companies that need to regis-
ter at the state level find there to be little advantage to avoid-
ance of federal registration. 205 Rounding out the figures would
be the Regulation A filings. Problems with that exemption
have resulted in its relative non-use. In 2002, there were only
30 Regulation A filings. 20 6
While impossible to know the total number of exempt of-
ferings made on an annual basis, the SEC's reported figures
suggest that the numbers are relatively small. Let us err on the
generous side and assume twice as many exempt offerings as
the reported number of 1983-4 Regulation D filings. That re-
sults in approximately 12,400 annual offerings pursuant to
statutory and regulatory exemptions, a not-so-whopping 2.5%
of all companies as of 1984, and less than 2% of all companies
using more recent figures. 20 7 It is difficult if not impossible to
believe that on an annual basis 98% of all non-farm companies
do not raise capital from investors through the sale of equity
or debt securities. 208 It is much easier to believe, especially
205. For example, the Ohio Division of Securities reported that in 2006
there were 152 offerings registered in Ohio, compared to nearly 2,000 ex-
empt offerings that were filed with the state. Of the 152 registered offerings,
it may be reasonably assumed that the majority were federally registered of-
ferings that were registered by coordination in Ohio, rather than offerings
registered by qualification such as intrastate offerings. 4 OHIo DEP'T OF COM-
MERCE, Drv. OF SEC. OHIO SEC. Q.BuLL. at 13 (2006), available at http://www.
securities.state.oh.us/bulletin/documents/BUL064.pdf.
206. 2002 SEC ANN. REP. at 79, available at http://sec.gov/pdf/annrep02/
ar02full.pdf. The SEC subsequently stopped reporting Regulation A filings
as a separate figure.
207. See supra note 204, at 487 (indicating total non-farm business enter-
prises other than sole proprietorships at 7.77 million in 2003).
208. Of course these are rough figures at best. The total number of com-
panies is based on tax returns, which may not reflect all business enterprises.
The size of such companies is not well known, but studies indicate that over
98% of all enterprises have less than 100 employees. BizStats.com, Free Busi-
ness Statistics and Financial Ratios, http://www.bizstats.com/reports/indus-
try-sales-firm-summary.asp (last visited March 1, 2007) (providing yearly total
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based on the constant pleas for reform, that a significant num-
ber of companies are forced to raise capital in ways that do not
conform to statutory and regulatory exemptions, hoping to
avoid the SEC's radar and potential civil liabilities.
2. The Commission May Be Concerned That Modifications to
Existing Limitations Would Undermine Investor
Protection
Is the Commission fearful that reducing constraints on
small business financing would open the door to abusive offer-
ings? Investo:' protection is the catalyst and continuing princi-
pal policy concern of the securities laws, a concern that cannot
be discounted or subordinated to capital raising goals. There
is just cause for concern regarding abusive offerings, a con-
cern that militates against the easing of exemption conditions.
The Commission could point to its recent experience with
Rule 504. In 1992, the SEC eliminated from Rule 504 both the
anti-solicitation provisions of Rule 502(c) and the resale limita-
tion provisions of Rule 502(d). These amendments basically
made Rule 504 a condition-free exemption except for the
monetary ceiling and integration limitations. In 1999, the SEC
recanted, reinstating both the Rule 502(c) and Rule 502(d)
limitations for Rule 504 offerings that were not state registered
(with a disclosure document) or were not made under a state
exemption that permits offers and sales only to accredited in-
vestors. 20 9 The SEC's about-face was the product of its concern
over so-called "pump and dump" schemes centered in the
state of New York, which, unlike most other states, has no re-
gistration requirement applicable to Rule 504 offerings. Rule
504 was being used by nefarious promoters to distribute up to
$1 million of securities in New York to a select favored group,
followed promptly by boiler-room promotions that artificially
drove up the secondary market price until such time as the
initial purchasers could sell their shares at a handsome profit,
number of U.S. businesses). Finally, an unknown portion of the Regulation
D filings reported in the 1984 SEC Study were not by small companies but by
venture capital companies and large corporations utilizing Rule 506 for capi-
tal raising purposes.
209. Revision of Rule 504 of Regulation D, the "Seed Capital Exemption,"
Securities Act Release No. 7,644, 69 SEC Docket 364, 368 (Feb. 25, 1999).
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leaving the gullible crop of new investors with suddenly de-
flated shares and irrecoverable losses. 210
No one would argue that the SEC should undermine in-
vestor protection in favor of liberalizing the capital formation
opportunities of small companies. But examination of the se-
curities violations that are of principal concern reveals that no
amount of technical exemption requirements will hinder the
fraud artists from their endeavors. As the Supreme Court
noted over 60 years ago, there are "countless and variable
schemes devised by those who seek the use of the money of
others on the promise of profits. '211 Fraudulent and deceptive
schemes have unfortunately continued unabated and indepen-
dent of formal registration or exemption requirements. 212 De-
liberate securities scams are not registered, as they would be
quickly discovered through review of disclosure documents.
To the extent that illegitimate schemes seek to rely on registra-
tion exemptions, inevitably those offerings are replete with
material misrepresentations and omissions. The disclosure
210. Unfortunately, there have been recent disturbing developments in
the secondary markets for some securities initially issued under Rule 504,
and to a lesser degree, in the initial Rule 504 issuances themselves. These
offerings generally involved the securities of "micro cap" companies, i.e.,
those characterized by thin capitalization, low share prices, limited public
information and little or no analyst coverage. Recent market innovations
and technological changes, most notably, the Internet, have created the pos-
sibility of nation-wide Rule 504 offerings for securities of non-reporting com-
panies that were once thought to be sold locally. In some cases, Rule 504 has
been used in fraudulent schemes to make prearranged "sales" of securities
under the rule to nominees in states that do not have registration or pro-
spectus delivery requirements. As a part of this arrangement, these securities
are then placed with broker-dealers who use cold-calling techniques to sell
the securities at ever-increasing prices to unknowing investors. When their
inventory of shares is exhausted, these firms permit the artificial market de-
mand created to collapse, and investors lose much, if not all, of their invest-
ment. This scheme is sometimes colloquially referred to as "pump and
dump." Id. at 365-66.
211. SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 299 (1946) (involving the defi-
nition of "investment contract" as applied to the sale of orange groves with
optional servicing contracts).
212. See, e.g., SEC v. Edwards, 540 U.S. 389 (2004) (holding that the sale
and leaseback of pay telephones to hundreds of investors constitutes a secur-
ities offering); Kathy Chu, Scam Artists Target Seniors' Savings, USA TODAY,
June 27, 2007, at 4B (reporting that 46.2% of investor complaints by senior
citizens to state administrators in 2004/2005 involved the sale of unregis-
tered securities).
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problems alone give rise to civil and criminal actions and re-
scission rights. 21 3 As discussed in Part V, we strongly urge the
SEC to incorporate a disclosure requirement for all federal ex-
emptions and for all purchasers, regardless of accredited inves-
tor status. It is not the legitimate small businesses that are cre-
ating the enforcement headaches for SEC and state regulators.
If many of the technical requirements of registration exemp-
tions were eliminated and replaced by a full disclosure obliga-
tion, legitimate small businesses would have much greater ac-
cess to capital markets without opening the door to nefarious
investment schemes.
Perhaps the SEC is concerned that private placements of
securities are more "dangerous" for investors than registered
offerings because of the lack of gatekeeper oversight. It cer-
tainly is true that a registered offering brings together an array
of professional advisors and intermediaries to assist the issuer.
Lawyers and accountants and, of course, underwriters help en-
sure that regulatory requirements are complied with and the
disclosure prospectus is complete and accurate. The rigorous
review and participation by experienced and knowledgeable
advisors - and the potential liability to which underwriters
are exposed - clearly increase investor protection. However,
as discussed at the outset of this article, smaller offerings can-
not support the professional fees and brokerage commissions
of a public offering, and smaller offerings simply do not attract
the attention and interest of the broker-dealer community. Im-
posing the registered public offering conduit apparatus on an
exempt offering is impossible as a practical matter, and we be-
213. Non-accredited investors are entitled to full disclosure for Rule 505
and 506 offerings, and all offerees are entitled to full disclosure under Regu-
lation A. Rule 504 offerings are invariably registered at the state level to take
advantage of the marketing and free transferability elements of that exemp-
tion. Although the intrastate exemptions do not have a disclosure condition,
any kind of general offering is likely to be subject to state registration and
concomitant disclosure requirements. The Section 4(2) private offering de-
mands access to or full disclosure of material information to all offerees and
purchasers. Thus, none of these exemptions are likely to be followed by pro-
moters of deliberately fraudulent schemes. That leaves only accredited inves-
tors in Rule 505 and 506 offerings as an unprotected class regarding disclo-
sure. In the authors' opinion, this is an unfortunate situation which should
be remedied. In any event, one would hope that accredited investors are
capable of discerning unwise investment opportunities, and if not, that Rule
10b-5 and state law remedies might offer them some relief.
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lieve it is unnecessary. The primary purpose of the participating
professionals in the public offering process is to ensure that
investors get the whole story, risks as well as opportunities, of
the investment. We believe an exemption program that em-
phasizes full disclosure achieves that purpose. State and fed-
eral anti-fraud rules, vigorously enforced through civil, crimi-
nal and administrative remedies, along with robust require-
ments on broker quotations and trading, should provide
sufficient protection to permit greater capital raising flexibility
for smaller companies.
If there are valid investor protection reasons for current
exemption requirements, those reasons should be on the pub-
lic record for appropriate analysis. One may appropriately ask
why the Commission has presented no policy justification for
its refusal to increase the offering limits for Rules 504 and 505
and Regulation A, its failure to adopt a "no harm no foul" ap-
proach to offers but not sales made to unqualified offerees in
intrastate and private offerings, its strict adherence to the nu-
merical limits of Rules 505 and 506, its staunch silence in the
face of constant criticism of its anti-solicitation rules, and the
continuation of other exemption requirements that appear to
have little bearing on investor protection. It has been over 30
years since the Commission undertook a serious study of small
business capital formation needs and the impact of registra-
tion exemption requirements. Much has transpired in the in-
terim, not least of which are the electronic communications
revolution and increased resources to federal and state agen-
cies to ferret out fraud and apply effective enforcement sanc-
tions. The time is ripe for new examination and analysis of the
interplay between investor protection and capital formation
opportunities.
3. The Commission May Believe that Modification of Federal
Exemptions Would Be Ineffective in Light of State
Regulations.
State regulation is not well coordinated with federal ex-
emptions and often renders such exemptions useless from the
issuer's standpoint. Exhibit A to the lack of coordination is,
aptly enough, Regulation A. Although Regulation A requires
SEC filing and review of a disclosure document that is substan-
tially similar to a registration statement, the federal exemption
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does not grant registration relief in most states. Most states re-
quire state registration of an offering exempt under Regula-
tion A, including audited financial statements that are gener-
ally not required by Regulation A and constitute an important
cost savings under the federal exemption. 21 4 In addition to
this incongruence, the SEC's 1992 adoption of a "testing the
waters" concept for Regulation A offerings was met with a
marked lack of enthusiasm, and some criticism, by state securi-
ties regulators. 21 5 To date, only a minority of states have
adopted regulations permitting the "testing of waters" in the
absence of a prior state registration.21 6 Whatever benefits Reg-
ulation A provides to issuers at the federal level have thus been
effectively emasculated by state regulation.
Similarly, even if the SEC eliminated from its exemptions
the prohibitions against general advertising and solicitation,
such elimination would not allow issuers ipsofacto to engage in
unrestrained marketing efforts within states. The ULOE ex-
emption adopted in most states imposes Regulation D's anti-
solicitation prohibition,217 and it is questionable whether fed-
eral modification would cause state regulators to relax that re-
quirement. State administrators may be more conservative
than even the SEC in opening the door to broad solicitation
efforts.218
In light of expected state antipathy to expanding exemp-
tion opportunities, it is reasonable to consider whether railing
214. Some states have created special provisions regarding the state regis-
tration of offerings federally exempt under Regulation A. See, e.g., Illinois
Securities Law of 1953, 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/5-B(1) (West 1999)
(waiving the requirement for audited financial statements for Regulation A
offerings).
215. See 24 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 405 (March 27, 1992) (testimony of
Arizona Securities Commissioner Dee Harris on behalf of North American
Securities Administrators Association to Senate Banking Securities Subcom-
mittee).
216. Arizona, Colorado, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Massachusetts, North
Dakota, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, Wis-
consin, and Wyoming, reported in I STUART R. COHN, SECURITIES COUNSEL-
ING FOR SMALL AND EMERGING COMPANIES, § 9:8, at 9-26 - 9-27 (West Supp.
2007).
217. See supra notes 169-170 and accompanying text (discussing the Uni-
form Limited Offering Exemption ("ULOE")).
218. See supra Part III (Lack of Coordination With State Laws, regarding
state administrator concerns).
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against SEC regulations is simply barking up the wrong tree, or
worse yet, an inherently futile waste of time. The answer could
be affirmative but for two important qualifications. The first is
the potentiality of federal preemption. After over 60 years of
concurrent federal-state regulation, Congress responded in
1996 to the lack of coordinated policy by creating a federal
preemption against state registration or exemption provisions
for so-called "covered securities," which include offerings
made under the Rule 506 exemption. 21 9 Pleas to expand the
preemption to other federal exemptions are heard regularly
from the SEC Small Business Forum participants. 220 Preemp-
tion would take congressional action, and whether small busi-
ness advocates have the political strength to overcome what is
likely to be strong state opposition is uncertain. 221 A second
factor is the potential for modification of state exemptions. Lo-
cal business interests and chambers of commerce have the ear
of state legislators. Effective lobbying efforts may lead to a re-
laxation of state exemption requirements. In recent years, nu-
merous states have adopted an accredited investor exemption
that allows general advertising and solicitation in offerings re-
219. National Securities Market Improvement Act of 1996 ("NSMIA"),
Pub. L. No. 91-190, § 102(a), 110 Stat. 3416, 3417-19 (1996) (codified at 15
U.S.C. § 77r). In addition to Rule 506 offerings, covered securities include,
inter alia, securities listed or authorized to be listed on a national securities
exchange or NASDAQ's Global Market [and Capital Market B pending], a
security of the issuer at least equal in seniority to a security exempt as a listed
security, securities issued by companies registered under the Investment
Company Act of 1940, and offers and sales to "qualified purchasers" as de-
fined by the SEC (which thus far the SEC has declined to do). Id. at
§ 102(a)(b).
220. See, e.g., 1997 Final Report calling for federal preemption of Regula-
tion A offerings (under "Securities Regulation"); the 1998 Final Report rec-
ommending federal preemption for Rule 505 and Regulation A offerings
(under "Securities Regulation Recommendations"); the 1999 Final Report
recommending that securities traded on the Nasdaq Small Cap market be
included within "covered securities" (under "Securities Regulation Recom-
mendations"); and the 2004 Final report recommending federal preemption
for all small business offerings of $5 million or less (Securities Regulation
Recommendation #16). Annual Final Reports may be accessed through the
SEC's web site. See supra note 184.
221. State securities administrators have noted, through the North Ameri-
can Securities Administrators Association, their collective concern regard-
ing the "negative effects" of federal preemption of state laws. State Securities
Regulators Want Congress to Ensure Their Authority, 40 Sec. Reg. L. Rep. (BNA)
161 (Feb. 5, 2008).
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stricted to accredited investors.222 A number of states have cre-
ated liberalized exemptions for local issuers, particular indus-
tries, or isolated offerings. 223 Some states have waived their re-
quirements for audited financial statements if the state
registered offering is federally exempt under Regulation A. 224
Pressures from the business community to modify state-im-
posed restraints on capital formation will undoubtedly con-
tinue at a pace no less than at the federal level. If the SEC were
to undertake the study and evaluation recommended, leading
to significant modifications to exemption requirements, there
could well be added pressure on state legislatures to adopt fur-
ther exemption modifications.
B. Looking at Some Comparative Foreign Exemptions
The concerns that restrain the SEC from creating greater
capital formation opportunities for smaller companies,
whatever they may be, are not shared in other countries with
developed securities markets. Despite the fact that foreign
countries frequently look to U.S. business and securities laws
as models for adoption, the strictures imposed in this country
on small business financing have not found favor elsewhere.
In the European Union, exemptions from the prospectus
requirement most applicable to smaller companies are:225
(A) An offer made solely to qualified investors;226
222. See 1 Blue Sky L. Rep. (CCH) 1 6471, at 2572 (2007) (listing states
that have adopted NASAA's Model Accredited Investor Exemption).
223. Alabama, for example, has a local issuer exemption for offerings up
to $500,000, where no purchaser other than an accredited investor
purchases more than $15,000. There is no stated prohibition on advertising
or solicitation. ALA. CODE § 8-6-11(a) (14) (LexisNexis 2002).
224. See, e.g., Illinois Securities Law of 1953, 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/
5-B(1) (West 1999). The waiver of audited financials also applies to offerings
exempt under Regulation D.
225. Council Directive 2003/71/EC, art. 3(2), 2003 O.J. (L 345) 64, 71,
available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/JOIndex.do.year=-2003&serie=L&text
field2=345&Submit=Search (last visited Nov. 4, 2007). There are limitations
on resales of securities so acquired where the resales could be deemed to be
public offerings.
226. Qualified investors are defined more narrowly than the U.S. version
of accredited investors. Natural persons qualify only if they meet two of the
following conditions: (i) the investor has carried out transactions of a signifi-
cant size on securities markets at an average frequency of at least 10 transac-
tions per quarter for the previous four quarters; (ii) the investor's portfolio
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(B) An offer addressed to fewer than 100 natural or legal
persons per Member state, other than qualified investors; or
(C) an offer with a total consideration of less than EUR
100,000 over a 12-month period.
There are no other conditions applicable to these exemp-
tions. Although the exemption based on a EUR 100,000 ceil-
ing (approximately $130,000 under current exchange ratios)
is low, many small companies in the U.S. would welcome the
opportunity to engage in a condition-free offering for such
amounts. We have not seen such an open-ended exemption
since the early days of regulation. 227 In contrast to SEC regula-
tion, the EU's exemption based upon the number of offerees
contains no personal qualifications, no specific disclosure re-
quirements, the number limitation is only on a country-by-
country basis (and thus could result in a considerable number
of purchasers), and, perhaps most significantly, there is no re-
striction on how purchasers can be solicited. To the contrary,
the EU specifically allows a wide variety of advertising solicita-
tion methods.22 8
The United Kingdom, although an EU member, has a dis-
tinctly different set of registration exemptions. "Exempt of-
fers" in the U.K. include the following:
(1) Offers to no more than 50 persons within a twelve
month period;229
exceeds EUR 0.5 million (approximately $650,000 under current exchange
ratios); and (iii) the investor works or has worked for at least one year in the
financial sector in a position that requires knowledge of securities invest-
ment. Id. at art. 2(2). Member states adopting the Directive can give greater
definition to the "significant size" condition. Poland, for example, has de-
fined that term to mean no less than EUR 50,000 per transaction. Act on
Public Offering, Conditions Governing the Introduction of Financial Instru-
ments to Organised Trading, and Public Companies, art. 8.2 (1), Journal of
Laws of 2005, No.184 item 1539 (July 29, 2005), available at http://www.
kpwig.gov.pl/bang.htm (last visited Nov. 4, 2007).
227. See supra notes 66-72 and accompanying text.
228. Among the listed forms of permitted communication are addressed
or unaddressed communications, electronic messages or advertisements re-
ceived by mobile phone, standard letters, press advertising with or without
order forms, seminars and presentations, radio, television, and web postings.
Commission Regulation 809/2004, 2004, implementing Council Directive
2003/71 (EC), available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/JOIndex.do?year2004
&serie=L&textfield2=1 49&Submit=search.
229. Financial Services and Markets Act, 2000, c. 8, § 103(6), sched. 11
(Eng.), available at http://www.opsi.gov.uk/acts2000/00008-az.htm.
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Journal of Law and Business
[Vol. 4:1
HeinOnline  -- 4 N.Y.U. J. L. & Bus. 78 2007-2008
2007] SEC'S FAILURE TO ADDRESS SMALL BUSINESS CONCERNS 79
(2) Offers to "a restricted circle of persons whom the of-
feror reasonably believes to be sufficiently knowledgeable to
understand the risks involved in accepting the offer;"230 and
(3) Offers involving no more than 40,000 Euros within a
twelve month period.23'
Many smaller companies in the U.S. would happily accept
the 50-person limit, which comes with no strings attached such
as purchaser qualifications or rules on how those persons are
chosen for solicitation. Even the "restricted circle" exemption
is far more generous for companies insofar as it does not, un-
like in the U.S., require that members of that circle be previ-
ously known 'to the issuer or issuer's agents. 232
South America's largest capital market, Brazil, provides a
registration exemption for "empresas de pequeno porte,"
small companies whose annual gross revenues do not exceed
R$2.4 million (equivalent to approximately $1.2 million under
current exchange rates).233 It is easy to contrast this exemp-
tion with the $1 million U.S. exemption, Rule 504, which is
replete with limitations on advertising and solicitation waived
only if the offering is state registered or made pursuant to a
state accredited investor exemption.
Exemptions developed for smaller companies elsewhere
in the world are probably not attributable to any greater faith
in foreign countries in the integrity of small companies but
rather to a cost-benefit analysis measuring the capital needs of
smaller companies with the risks of offering abuses. In the ab-
sence of most of the U.S.-type conditions governing exempt
offerings, there appears to be a greater reliance in foreign
countries on post-offering remedial actions. This analysis con-
230. Id. at 6(1).
231. Id. at 9(1), (2)(b).
232. The limited exemptions afforded by the United Kingdom and the
European Union have also been criticized for their lack of attention to small
business capital requirements. Hse-Yu Chiu, Can UK Small Businesses Obtain
Growth Capital in the Public Equity Markets? Can Overview of the Shortcomings in
UK and European Securities Regulation and Considerations for Reform, 28 DEL. J.
CoiP. L. 933, 935 (2003) ("The highly regulated public equity market is de-
terring to small issuers because of the high cost of compliance as compared
to their relatively small issues.").
233. Art. 5, § III, Instrucao CVM 400/03, de 29 de dezembro de 2003.
Empresas de pequeno porte are defined in Complementary Law No. 123
(Dec. 14, 2006).
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tains enormous irony, for the one thing that U.S. securities
laws are most known for is the effective public and private en-
forcement processes ranging from administrative to civil to
criminal sanctions. Yet, the SEC remains reluctant to rely sig-
nificantly on post-offering remedies when it comes to small
company issuers.
V.
PART V: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR REFORM
A. Where We Are Today: In Need of Rational Regulation
Small businesses depend on multiple rounds of financing
to develop new products and services and to expand their mar-
keting opportunities. The ability to access the public markets
for capital is affected by numerous factors, the timing and
scope of most of which are beyond the control of the particu-
lar small business issuer. Capital market "windows" often are
brief in duration, and smaller companies do not have the abil-
ity, as do larger ones, to take advantage of favorable condi-
tions by quickly developing a registration statement. Neverthe-
less, difficult market conditions may present business opportu-
nities for smaller companies. The airline industry is one
example of how new companies, unburdened by legacy costs,
can penetrate a key business segment. Difficult economic
times can provide significant opportunities for companies that
can nimbly fill a gap or capitalize on an emerging technology.
A registered public offering does not provide the clearest capi-
tal path for many smaller companies in this situation. A quick
capital raise, outside the registration process, is often precisely
what the smaller companies need. Unfortunately, Byzantine
regulations often render registration exemptions unavailable.
The result is stifled innovation and loss of business opportu-
nity.
Venture capital financing is one avenue open to compa-
nies that do not have ready access to public capital and institu-
tional financing. In 2007, $29.4 billion of private venture capi-
tal funded over 3500 companies at an average investment of
$7.73 million.2 34 These statistics are impressive, but they mask
234. Money Tree Report by PricewaterhouseCoopers and National Ven-
ture Capital Association, http://www.nvc.org/ffax.html, https://www.pwc
moneytree.com/MTPublic/ns/index.jsp.
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the fact that only a very small percentage of applicants receive
venture funding, and companies that need relatively small
amounts generally cannot get onto a venture capital com-
pany's radar screen.
Growth capital for small businesses remains scarce, due in
large part to the inability of small businesses to connect di-
rectly with funding sources. The internet is not a door to fund-
ing sources due to the restrictions on general solicitation for
most private offerings. The regulatory scheme governing ex-
empt offerings has been largely unchanged for 25 years, with
drastic results for smaller businesses. Now is the time to mod-
ernize the regulatory landscape, acknowledge the changes that
modern information and communications technologies have
wrought and remove the impediments to capital raising for
smaller businesses. We believe this can be done without sacri-
fice to investor protection.
B. Reform Recommendations
Although there are numerous specific problem areas
within each registration exemption that could be addressed on
a piecemeal basis, we recommend that the Commission capi-
talize on the momentum of its August 2007 Release to under-
take more comprehensive measures to assist small business fi-
nancing. To accomplish this, we suggest the following:
1. Task Force on Small Business Capital Formation
Our principal recommendation is that the SEC establish a
broadly representative task force on small business capital for-
mation to examine whether and to what extent current laws
and regulations impede small business financing and deter-
mine recommendations for improving financing capabilities
under the federal and state securities laws. The task force
should include representatives of small business, state securi-
ties administrators, self-regulatory organizations, American
Bar Association committees, broker-dealers, the accounting
profession, and others from both the public and private sec-
tors who would have relevant input. The SEC has not under-
taken a comprehensive study of small business concerns for
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nearly 30 years, 235 an extraordinarily long period of time given
the changes in financial markets and technologies.
2. Recommendations Regarding Special Areas of Concern
Without intending to limit the scope of the proposed
Task Force's examination, we would recommend that the fol-
lowing issues be considered:
(a) Enact Broader Federal Preemption of State Registration and
Exemption Laws. Reform of federal exemptions will be without
significant effect unless such exemptions can be utilized under
state laws. Congress took the first steps towards preemption in
1996,236 and the ability of issuers to avoid state registration re-
quirements through Rule 506 has not appeared to create seri-
ous state law risks. States should remain able to police offer-
ings, issue stop orders, and impose administrative and criminal
penalties through their disclosure standards, while allowing is-
suers who meet federal exemption requirements to offer and
sell securities without state registration or exemption condi-
tions. Expanding federal preemption to all exemptions from
registration, except perhaps the intrastate exemption, would
be among the most significant measures that could be taken
for small businesses. Assuming that adequate disclosure stan-
dards are imposed, and antifraud provisions remain at both
the federal and state levels, preemption would not, in our
judgment, impair investor protection concerns.
(b) Place Greater Reliance on Disclosure and Antifraud Sanc-
tions. We believe that the dual concerns of investor protection
and small business financing can best be accommodated
through clear disclosure standards mandated for all federal ex-
emptions. We propose elimination of many of the current
technical exemption requirements in favor of a disclosure re-
gime that is both adequate and enforceable. In this regard, we
support a disclosure program for all investors, including ac-
credited investors, whatever the monetary amount of the offer-
ing. If issuers are seeking capital from investors, a minimum
disclosure obligation should exist regarding company and
235. Examination of the Effects of Rules and Regulations on the Ability of
Small Business to Raise Capital and the Impact on Small Business of Disclo-
sure Requirements Under the Securities Act, Securities Act Release No.
5,914, 42 Fed. Reg. 64,163 (Mar. 6, 1978).
236. See supra note 166.
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management information, use of proceeds, financial state-
ments, and offering risks. A mandatory disclosure requirement
would be consistent with protection of investors as well as pro-
vide issuers a measure of protection from Rule lOb-5 and
other disclosure-related liabilities. By restricting its represen-
tations to those contained in a disclosure document, the issuer
retains control over representations that are made and has the
opportunity to ensure that all material information is fully and
fairly presented to prospective investors. Further, the rigorous
review procedure employed to draft a disclosure document
provides assurance that essential information is conveyed to
prospective purchasers of securities.
(c) Eliminate Restraints on General Solicitation and General Ad-
vertising. Prohibitions on general solicitation and advertising
should be eliminated. Investor protection should be much
more concerned with what is said, rather than to whom or in
what manner the disclosure is made. Antifraud standards can
effectively replace the anti-solicitation regulations and would
apply on a case by case basis to circumstances where disclosure
is misleading or inadequate, or where the issuer is or should
be aware that the particular investor lacks the capacity to un-
derstand the disclosures.
(d) Narrow the Definition of "Offer". Initial contacts by issuers
and their agents, and limited advertising materials, should not
be treated as "offers" for securities law purposes if the poten-
tial investors cannot purchase any securities until after they are
provided with appropriate disclosure documents and subscrip-
tion agreements. In view of the telecommunications and me-
dia revolution, the SEC should recognize that it is both unreal-
istic and unnecessary to restrict communications in connec-
tion with exempt offerings. Therefore, the SEC should define
"offers" consistent with traditional concepts of contract law
and eliminate restrictions on early-stage advertising or general-
interest type announcements.
(e) Eliminate or Substantially Limit the Integration and Aggrega-
tion Doctrines. The continued need for the integration doctrine
should be closely examined. We believe each offering should
be allowed to stand on its own with regard to compliance. Mis-
use or abuse of exemption conditions can be handled on a
case by case basis without resort to an integration doctrine. If
the integration concept is to be retained, the safe harbor time
frame should be reduced to 30 days for all exempt offerings
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Journal of Law and Business
HeinOnline  -- 4 N.Y.U. J. L. & Bus. 83 2007-2008
NYU JOURNAL OF LAW AND BUSINESS
subject to instances of clear abuse. Similarly, we recommend
elimination of the analogous aggregation doctrine. Where an
offering meets all exemption conditions, a subsequent offer-
ing meeting all exemption conditions should not be inte-
grated or subject to aggregation except in clear cases of abuse.
(t) Carve Back Substantially the "Sophistication" Requirement
for Private Offerings. The "sophistication" required under Sec-
tion 4(2) of the 1933 Securities Act and Rule 506 creates sig-
nificant concern because the standard is ambiguous and, as
interpreted by the SEC, too strict. Offerings should be permit-
ted to be made to all persons capable of understanding and
evaluating the disclosures. We are concerned that proposed
Rule 507, which will require prior investment experience, is a
step in the wrong direction. There is no justification in our
judgment for prohibiting persons of ordinary intelligence,
who have the right today to invest in registered offerings, from
investing in exempt offerings for which adequate disclosure
has been made.
(g) Eliminate Issuer's Potential Loss of Exemption By Reason of
Unforeseen Resales. If the issuer has made a good faith attempt
to limit resales, an exemption should not be lost by reason of
untimely resale or resale to an ineligible purchaser. This rec-
ommendation assumes that some form of "restricted securi-
ties" will survive as a condition for various exemptions, an issue
that itself deserves further study as to whether such restrictions
are in fact necessary for investor protection purposes.
(h) Increase Exemption Ceilings. If it is considered appropri-
ate to retain a monetary ceiling on some exemptions, itself a
debatable point, current ceilings should be substantially in-
creased. The SEC's recently-enacted authority to create ex-
emptions under Section 28 of the 1933 Securities Act permits
the Commission to avoid Section 3(b)'s $5 million monetary
ceiling should the Commission choose to act without further
legislative authorization.
(i) Modify the 'Doing Business" Standards of the Intrastate Ex-
emptions. The 80% standards in Rule 147 have become anach-
ronistic in these days of global business and communications.
If the intrastate exemption continues to have a "doing busi-
ness" requirement, it should be reduced to a principal place of
business test.
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Y) Eliminate or Substantially Increase the Numerical Limits on
Purchasers. The 35 person limitation on non-accredited inves-
tors in Rule 505 and Rule 506 should be eliminated or substan-
tially increased. The number is arbitrary and restrains compa-
nies from marketing securities to more than a relatively few
investors who do not meet the accredited investor standard.
The limitation may also preclude a company from offering
shares to its employees or seeking investments from customers
and others interested in the issuer's products or services. The
numerical limitation also creates unnecessary regulation in the
context of mergers and other corporate reorganizations. Ex-
cept where Section 3(a) (11) or Rule 147 may apply, a registra-
tion statement is necessary to effect an ordinary corporate
transaction in which stock is used as consideration if there are
more than 35 unaccredited investors in the target company.
(k) Implement Rules Permitting Private Placement Brokers and
Finders. Even though many Blue Sky laws limit the payment of
commissions or other compensation to registered securities in-
termediaries, there are literally thousands of "finders" and
other persons willing to match private investors and smaller
companies for a fee, typically contingent on a successful invest-
ment and the amount of funds raised, who are not registered
as broker-dealers with the FINRA or the states in which they
operate.2 37 We believe the SEC, as recommended by its own
Advisory Committee on Smaller Public Companies, should
spearhead a reform effort among the FINRA and the states to
provide a simplified registration process and on-going regula-
tory oversight better adapted to the limited nature of the busi-
ness of private placement brokers.
VI.
CONCLUSIONS
As critics of the current scheme of registration exemp-
tions, we are both discouraged and hopeful. After a quarter
century of neglect, the SEC has finally turned its attention to
the serious impediments to capital formation created by its
regulations and interpretations. We are discouraged because,
237. E.g., Uniform Limited Offering Exemption, § L.A ("No commission,
fee or other remuneration shall be paid or given, directly or indirectly, to
any person for soliciting any prospective purchasers in this state unless such
person is appropriately registered in this state.").
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despite the rhetoric in recent years, the door has opened only
inches and not nearly enough to provide effective assistance to
smaller businesses with capital needs. 23 8 We are hopeful be-
cause the path to reform is clear. We have proposed a set of
recommendations that we believe are consistent with investor
protection concerns. The notion that, in an internet world, po-
tential investors can be hidden beyond the reach of peddlers
of fraudulent securities is obsolete. We do not believe, how-
ever, that the specter of unscrupulous fraudsters preying upon
innocent investors justifies the unnecessarily burdensome reg-
ulation which currently hamstrings new and growing compa-
nies. When one of the authors of this article was an SEC staff
member, the hallway admonition was to protect "the little old
lady in tennis shoes." That investor and all others deserve reg-
ulations that require full and comprehensible disclosure and
provide for adequate means to enforce violations of those pro-
visions. We believe that it is better to base a regulatory format
on disclosure and antifraud provisions rather than restrictive
exemption conditions that severely hamper financing capaci-
ties. Government resources expended for unnecessary regula-
tion could be better employed, we propose, for enforcement
purposes.
238. SEC Commissioner Atkins conceded the need to do more in his re-
marks during the SEC Open Meeting on May 23, 2007, in connection with
the Commission's rulemaking proposals to address small business capital
raising activities. Commissioner Atkins notably made the following observa-
tion:
I mentioned that these proposals make an excellent start because I
do not believe that the Commission's work in this area is going to
be finished after today or even after we adopt these particular sets
of proposals. Our proposals do not address other issues brought up by the
Advisory Committee, the forum, or the ABA, such as finders and private
placement broker/dealers, expanding and testing the waters provision that
we first put in back in the early 1990s, clarifying the definition of "control"
for certain purposes, or revising Rules 504 and 505. I think more work
needs to be done by the Commission to achieve an optimal level of
investor protection and capital formation for smaller companies.
The staff has only been significantly engaged on these rulemakings since the
beginning of this year. I would encourage you all to continue your
fine work in this area and present some additional ideas. I look
forward to seeing this during the year.
Unofficial transcript of the May 23, 2007 (emphasis added), SEC Open
Meeting available at http://www.sec.gov/news/openmeetings.shtml.
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The dual goals of capital formation and investor protec-
tion are not mutually exclusive. Each can be accomplished
without diminishing the other. Although we have proposed a
number of specific recommendations, we believe that the start-
ing point should be a comprehensive review of the registration
and exemption structure, including the impact of dual federal-
state regulation. The agenda is transparent - create a unified
regulatory system for limited offerings of securities which en-
courages investment in small business and protects those who
so invest. Implementation cannot happen overnight or with-
out some political confrontation and pain, but the issues are
clear. In a fast-changing and increasingly global financial mar-
ketplace, the SEC is the logical, in fact the only, regulator that
can lead the effort for meaningful change. It is charged to do
so, and we are hopeful that the Commission will accept the
challenge.
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